Algiers Draws a Line Against Gulf Interference from Sudan to Libya

A political threshold approaching

Algeria is entering a more sensitive phase in its relationship with the United Arab Emirates (UAE). From Libya to Sudan and across the Sahel, Algerian officials have increasingly criticised what they describe as a pattern of external interference by Abu Dhabi—one which, in Algiers’ assessment, contributes to instability and shifts regional balances in ways that undermine local political settlements.

According to regional diplomatic reporting and sources familiar with Algerian decision-making, Algiers is weighing additional steps to downgrade relations with the UAE. While a full rupture remains uncertain, such a move would reflect years of accumulated tension and Algeria’s growing view that the relationship has become strategically difficult to sustain.

President Abdelmadjid Tebboune has progressively sharpened his tone. In March 2024, he remarked that “wherever there is conflict, the money of that state is present,” referring to Mali, Libya and Sudan—comments widely interpreted as aimed at the UAE. Since then, developments in several theatres have reinforced Algerian concerns, although the UAE rejects accusations of destabilising involvement and maintains that its engagement supports development and stability.

Sudan: allegations of external backing and a deepening war

Sudan is where Algerian officials see the starkest illustration of harmful external involvement. In Algiers’ framing, foreign financing and logistical support to armed actors has contributed to sustaining a conflict with catastrophic humanitarian consequences, including mass displacement and high levels of civilian casualties.

Several investigations, diplomatic statements and independent reports have alleged that UAE-linked networks may have enabled material support reaching the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), including through indirect supply channels. Abu Dhabi has repeatedly denied providing arms or military support to any Sudanese party, presenting its role as humanitarian and diplomatic.

For Algeria, the core issue is strategic: external engagement that empowers armed faction’s risks hardening battlefield positions, reducing incentives for negotiated compromise, and intensifying spillover risks in the wider region.

South Sudan: resource pressures and governance vulnerability

In South Sudan, Algerian commentary and some regional observers point to a different form of influence—economic leverage and opaque commercial networks surrounding oil revenues. In Algiers’ interpretation, financial and logistical bottlenecks affecting export flows can create opportunities for outside actors to shape access to revenue streams and decision-making in fragile states.

At the same time, South Sudan’s oil sector has been severely affected by wider regional instability, including disruptions linked to conflict dynamics in Sudan and reliance on external export infrastructure. As economic pressures deepen, governance systems remain vulnerable to rent-seeking behaviour and informal financial channels, regardless of which external partners benefit most.

The overall impact is persistent fiscal fragility, uneven service delivery, and continued food insecurity for large segments of the population—conditions that make external leverage more consequential.

Libya: support for Haftar and the persistence of fragmentation

In Libya, Algeria has long opposed sustained foreign backing for competing armed coalitions. Emirati support for Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar has been widely reported over the course of the conflict and remains a central grievance for Algiers, which argues that such support has contributed to prolonging fragmentation and weakening prospects for national reconciliation.

From Algeria’s perspective, the security implications are direct. Instability in southern Libya—particularly the movement of armed groups and control contests around strategic routes and resource zones—raises risks of arms proliferation, trafficking and militant mobility along Algeria’s eastern frontier. For Algiers, these are not abstract geopolitical issues but tangible border-security pressures that complicate its internal and regional security calculus.

The Sahel: expanding engagement and uneven transparency

Algerian assessments also increasingly note the UAE’s expanding footprint in the Sahel. Publicly, Emirati engagement is framed around investment, development assistance and support to partner governments. However, limited transparency around certain financial arrangements and security cooperation has fed suspicions in parts of the region that commercial positioning and strategic influence may be central drivers.

Regional analysts describe a hybrid approach combining aid, business outreach and security partnerships. In supportive interpretations, this positions the UAE as a capable partner with resources to contribute to counterterrorism and stabilisation. In critical interpretations—echoed more strongly in Algeria—such engagement can create dependency and reshape local power balances without strengthening accountable state institutions.

Algeria’s doctrine: sovereignty, dialogue, and non-interference

Against this backdrop, Algeria reiterates a long-standing doctrine rooted in its post-independence political identity: respect for sovereignty, peaceful conflict resolution, and non-interference. Algerian diplomacy has consistently promoted negotiated political processes in Libya and called for de-escalation and dialogue in Sudan, warning against the militarisation of African crises and the empowerment of non-state armed actors.

Algerian officials contrast this approach with what they characterise as Gulf strategies that rely on financial leverage and indirect intervention. Attempts to ease bilateral tensions in 2025 reportedly produced limited progress, strengthening the perception in Algiers that the relationship is unlikely to stabilise without a change in Emirati regional posture.

UAE–Morocco–Israel cooperation: Algerian perceptions of strategic pressure

Normalization between the UAE and Israel under the Abraham Accords has reshaped aspects of regional geopolitics. In Algiers, growing cooperation between the UAE and Morocco—alongside Morocco’s expanding partnerships with Israel—is often interpreted through a competitive lens, with officials describing it as part of a broader effort to reduce Algeria’s influence in the Maghreb and contest its positions in African diplomacy.

The UAE’s decision to open a consulate in Laâyoune, in Western Sahara, has been cited by Algerian voices as a particularly provocative step. Algeria views this as inconsistent with international legal parameters and as a political signal of alignment with Morocco on an issue central to Algerian foreign policy.

While these perceptions are not universally shared across the region, they remain influential in Algiers’ strategic reading of Emirati intentions.

A widening regional reassessment

Algeria argues that its concerns are increasingly echoed elsewhere, as some regional actors debate the longer-term costs of external competition through proxy partnerships and selective intervention. While Gulf engagement in Africa remains diverse and not uniformly destabilising, Algeria’s position is that external power projection—when it shapes conflict dynamics or undermines political settlements—carries significant regional risks.

President Tebboune has reiterated Algeria’s interest in peaceful coexistence and pragmatic relations, while also warning that “patience has limits.” For Algiers, sovereignty and non-interference are core strategic principles rather than rhetorical preferences.

From Algeria’s perspective, the dispute with the UAE is less a tactical disagreement than a clash between different approaches to regional order. Any further downgrading of diplomatic ties would likely be framed not as escalation for its own sake, but as an assertion of a principle: African crises, in Algeria’s view, should not be shaped by external agendas at the expense of stability, state cohesion, and the welfare of affected populations.