The ASA Situation Reports™ provide updates on key developments across the African continent. While primarily focused on Security, they also cover Political, Social and Economic Events, ensuring you'll stay informed on the most important developments.
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Morocco is assessing the potential acquisition of up to 400 K2 Black Panther main battle tanks from South Korea, a move that would represent one of the most ambitious armoured modernization reviews considered by a North African army in recent years.
As the global economy continues to navigate post-pandemic fragmentation, inflationary pressures, and geopolitical realignments, East Africa is consolidating its position as the continent’s primary growth engine.
Kenya has launched one of the most consequential capital-markets operations in its history with the planned listing of Kenya Pipeline Company. Announced by President William Ruto, the transaction involves the sale of 65% of the company’s equity, targeting KES 106.3 billion.
Algeria is entering a more sensitive phase in its relationship with the UAE. From Libya to Sudan and across the Sahel, Algerian officials have increasingly criticised what they describe as a pattern of external interference by Abu Dhabi—one which, in Algiers’ assessment, contributes to instability and shifts regional balances in ways that undermine local political settlements.
Heads of State of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (CEMAC) are expected in Brazzaville on 22 January 2026 for an extraordinary summit convened by Denis Sassou Nguesso, acting President of the Conference.
South Africa’s M&A environment is facing a new layer of uncertainty following a landmark ruling by the country’s top court, which clarified and expanded the rights of third-party interventions in competition reviews.
Relations between Benin and Niger have become increasingly strained following reports that several Nigerien intelligence operatives were arrested in Cotonou.
Ivanhoe Mines reported it met its 2025 production guidance, supported by steady performance at the Kamoa-Kakula copper complex and strong output from the Kipushi zinc mine.
Morocco’s run to the final of the Africa Cup of Nations has generated a surge of national pride and political goodwill. The success on the pitch has, at least temporarily, muted criticism of the scale and pace of public investment linked to major sporting events, notably AFCON and preparations for the 2030 FIFA World Cup, which Morocco will co-host.
Mali’s industrial gold production recorded a sharp contraction in 2025, falling by approximately 22.9% year-on-year. The decline marks one of the most significant output drops in the country’s modern mining history and reflects the growing cost of unresolved regulatory conflict between the state and major operators.
South Africa’s long-standing prime lending rate framework has come under renewed scrutiny as the Competition Commission examines whether the system may entrench anti-competitive pricing behaviour within the banking sector.
Kenya’s authorities have issued a clear warning: cybercrime is evolving faster than conventional investigative tools. The Directorate of Criminal Investigations has acknowledged that digital fraud, online financial crime, and technology-enabled offenses now require specialized capabilities that go beyond standard policing methods.
Egypt has officially launched its first semi-automated container terminal at Sokhna, marking a significant step in the modernization of its port and logistics infrastructure. Operated under a 30-year concession, the terminal is designed to strengthen Egypt’s position as a critical maritime gateway along the Asia–Europe trade route, directly linked to the Suez Canal corridor.
Cape Verde’s banking sector is entering a new phase following Coris Bank Group’s move to take control of BCA, the country’s largest and most systemically important bank.
The withdrawal of AFC/M23 elements from Uvira, imposed under external pressure, has been framed publicly as a step toward de-escalation. African Security Analysis (ASA) assesses the episode differently: as a temporary reset driven by diplomatic optics, not a durable political settlement.
In December, the MPLJ claimed responsibility for two attacks targeting the Niger–Benin oil pipeline, underscoring the group’s continued focus on high-impact economic infrastructure. Both incidents occurred in Diffa Region within the Agadem oil zone, reinforcing concerns over the persistent vulnerability of critical extractive assets despite ongoing security deployments.
On 7 Dec 2025, elements within Benin’s armed forces launched a coordinated attempt to destabilise the government in Cotonou, including attacks on senior military residences, a temporary seizure of the state broadcaster SRTB, and efforts to access the Presidential Palace.
Throughout December, extremist armed group activity remained concentrated in Burkina Faso’s Est, Sahel, and Centre-Nord regions. Reporting highlighted recurrent attacks on VDP positions and continued incursions into rural communities, sustaining pressure on local security structures and civilian populations.
On Dec 25, 2025, the United States conducted precision airstrikes in Nigeria’s Sokoto State, targeting militant camps tied to the Lakurawa group, which has uncertain and loosely defined links to the IS-SP. U.S. President Donald Trump publicly framed the strikes as a “powerful and deadly” operation against “ISIS Terrorist Scum,” presenting them as retaliation for the persecution and killing of Christians in Nigeria.
The DRC occupies a structurally irreplaceable position in the global industrial system. The country remains the world’s dominant source of mined cobalt, accounting for roughly 70–72% of global supply in 2024 and producing around 220,000 tonnes in that year alone.
During December, JNIM sustained and intensified its fuel embargo campaign in Mali by repeatedly targeting fuel convoys and related infrastructure along key supply routes leading from southern and central Mali toward Bamako.
Uganda enters the January 2026 presidential and legislative elections in a state of profound political polarization and institutional distrust. What is formally an election has become a referendum on the nature of power itself: whether governance continues to rest on security dominance and liberation-era legitimacy, or whether it must transition toward accountability, inclusion, and generational renewal.
In January 2026, South Africa hosted the multilateral naval exercise Mosi-3, rebranded Will for Peace 2026, involving China, Russia, and Iran. While operationally limited, the exercise carried high symbolic and strategic weight.
This in-depth report examines Al-Shabaab’s evolution from a Somali-based insurgency into a persistent regional security threat across East Africa, particularly impacting Kenya, Ethiopia, and Djibouti.
A mining loader fills a truck with bauxite ore at a site in Guinea. The country holds the world’s largest bauxite reserves, making such assets central to its economy.
Libya enters 2025 trapped in a long transition failure that began after the fall of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. The country’s conflict has evolved from open civil war into a durable stalemate: rival authorities persist, armed groups are embedded in state structures, and foreign powers deter decisive military outcomes while deepening Libya’s loss of sovereignty.
The war in eastern DRC has evolved into more than a battlefield crisis – it has become a public test of Africa’s peace and security system. Kinshasa has increasingly accused the AU of failing to respond with urgency or force, while simultaneously investing in mediation efforts outside Africa, particularly in Doha and Washington.
Burundi is facing a rapidly worsening humanitarian and security situation following a major refugee influx from eastern DRC in December 2025. More than 100,000 Congolese civilians have entered Burundi this month, fleeing intense fighting in South Kivu.
Somaliland declared itself independent from Somalia in 1991 after the collapse of the Somali state. The region had briefly been an independent nation in 1960 (as former British Somaliland) before uniting with Somalia, but it broke away following decades of conflict under the Siad Barre regime.
The December 2025 Security Council resolution renewing the mandate of the MONUSCO marks a clear shift in tone and emphasis. Rather than expanding efforts to stabilize the country, the new mandate effectively lays the groundwork for a gradual UN withdrawal.
On 22 December 2025, the United Nations Security Council convened an open meeting on the crisis in Sudan. The session was requested by the Sudanese transitional government amid a dramatic escalation of the nearly three-year conflict between the SAF and the paramilitary RSF.
West Africa and the Sahel are facing a systemic risk environment as multiple security and governance crises converge into a single regional emergency. Over the past few years, an unprecedented wave of instability has swept through the region, undermining decades of fragile progress.
Ten days ahead of the Central African Republic’s presidential election, an extensive investigative report has placed the country’s crypto experiments at the centre of a broader debate on governance, sovereignty, and criminal capture of state assets.
Kenya’s receipt and deployment of the Israeli-made SPYDER air defence system marks a decisive shift in the country’s defence posture, reflecting a growing recognition that airspace is no longer a permissive domain in modern African conflicts.
Algeria’s appointment of General Abbas Ibrahim as head of the Central Directorate of Army Security (DCSA) marks the latest move in a pattern of rapid leadership rotation across intelligence, security, and senior executive institutions.
The opening of the campaign for the 28 December 2025 elections in the Central African Republic marks a high-risk political moment in a country where electoral processes remain deeply intertwined with security dynamics.
The United Arab Emirates has consolidated its position as one of the world’s dominant gold trading and refining hubs, importing an estimated 1,400 tons of gold worth more than USD 105 billion in 2024, according to a SWISSAID’s press release (Nov 4, 2025).
Russia’s actions in Africa are increasingly under scrutiny. Beyond claims of being targeted by Western disinformation, Moscow faces allegations ranging from attacks on African journalists to contested security outcomes and exploitative labor linked to the war economy.
Iran’s IRGC naval units intercepted an Eswatini-flagged vessel transporting approximately 350,000 litres of smuggled fuel in the Persian Gulf. Thirteen foreign crew members—mostly Indian nationals—were detained, and the vessel was escorted to Bushehr port for offloading and investigation.
Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo is entering one of its most dangerous phases in years. The potential fall of Uvira – the last major government-held city in South Kivu – signals not just a battlefield setback, but the near total collapse of state control along the Kivu corridor.
Niger’s military authorities have triggered a major geopolitical and legal confrontation by openly violating an order of the ICSID and exporting uranium previously operated by the French nuclear conglomerate Orano.
In December, the Security Council will convene an open briefing followed by closed consultations on West Africa and the Sahel. Special Representative Leonardo Santos Simão, Head of the UNOWAS, is expected to brief Council members, and a civil society representative may also be invited.
The Security Council is scheduled to receive its regular 60-day briefing on Libya in December. Special Representative Hanna Serwaa Tetteh, Head of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), will brief members on the political stalemate, the fragile security environment, and ongoing humanitarian concerns.
The Security Council is expected to reauthorise the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM) before its mandate expires at the end of December. In parallel, the Council will also review the renewal of the 2713 Al-Shabaab sanctions regime, including the maritime interdiction component, which lapses on 13 December.
The Security Council is scheduled to hold a briefing and consultations in December on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC).
Central Africa entered the final quarter of 2025 amid intensifying political tensions, weakened institutional cohesion, and persistent extremist activity. ECCAS experienced a major rupture following the extension of Equatorial Guinea’s presidency and Rwanda’s subsequent withdrawal, reducing the organisation’s capacity for coordinated crisis management. Cameroon’s highly contested 12 October election triggered violent protests, adding to longstanding instability in the Anglophone regions.
Current evidence indicates that the evolving Morocco–Spain relationship is not a standard diplomatic realignment, nor a mere normalization process.
Guinea-Bissau did not fall into chaos, nor did soldiers storm the streets in protest. Instead, the country experienced a quiet, well-coordinated intervention by senior officers.
The November 2025 military coup in Guinea-Bissau was not a popular uprising nor an ideological purge such as those seen in Burkina Faso or Mali. It emerged as an internal bargain between the same power brokers who have historically ruled the country: the presidency, the senior military hierarchy, and the networks tied to the illicit economy.
Guinea-Bissau’s latest military takeover did not erupt from the streets or from barracks on the verge of rebellion. It materialized through administrative interruption.
On 23 November 2025, Tanzania confirmed that construction of the deep-sea port of Bagamoyo will begin in December, ending a decade of political stalemates, negotiations, and uncertainty.
Rwanda has formalized a landmark defence-manufacturing agreement with Türkiye, marking one of Kigali’s most ambitious steps toward building a sovereign defence-industrial base.
Tunisia has approved a new national framework for military procurement, marking a decisive shift toward faster acquisitions, stronger industrial participation, and reduced dependence on foreign suppliers.
Egypt and Türkiye have concluded a landmark $5 billion defense co-production agreement, marking the most significant bilateral military-industrial partnership between the two nations in modern history.
Uganda’s confirmation of a 31 million-barrel discovery at Kingfisher North—together with up to 600 million barrels of new prospects identified by UNOC—marks a major expansion of the Albertine Basin.
Between 4 and 18 November 2025, JNIM intensified military, ideological, and propaganda activities across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, signaling a strategic shift toward broader territorial influence and coercive governance.
The Sahel and coastal West Africa face a rapidly evolving security crisis. Armed Islamist networks—including JNIM, Boko Haram, and ISWAP—are expanding operational reach across Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and toward the Gulf of Guinea, exploiting governance vacuums, porous borders, and overstretched national militaries.
Despite the Doha Framework Agreement’s promise of a permanent ceasefire, fighting has resumed almost immediately across North and South Kivu—exposing deep structural flaws in the deal and the absence of any functional verification mechanism.
Belgium’s decision to shutter several embassies in sub-Saharan Africa – most notably in Burkina Faso and Niger – signals more than administrative streamlining. It reflects a strategic contraction of influence shaped by fiscal austerity, security deterioration in the Sahel, and rising competition from non-Western actors.
The case of Lieutenant-Colonel Birotsho Nzanzu Kossi, FARDC military intelligence officer previously responsible for the ADF/ISCAP portfolio in North Kivu, reveals a critical intersection between judicial dysfunction, internal security rivalries, and the erosion of national counter-insurgency capacity.
A widening crisis inside the Democratic Republic of Congo’s P-DDRCS – the national peacebuilding agency under direct presidential authority – has brought core disarmament and reintegration efforts to a standstill. For more than 35 months, field agents across North Kivu have gone unpaid, prompting an unprecedented dry strike and direct appeals to the Presidency. The paralysis has eroded public trust, interrupted contact with ex-combatants, and destabilized local security dynamics at a moment of rising militia activity.
The Republic of Guinea entered a new phase of its modern history this Tuesday, 11 November 2025, with the official launch of the Simandou iron ore megaproject, presided over by General Mamadi Doumbouya.
The French Navy’s amphibious assault and command ship PHA Tonnerre made a strategic port call in Cotonou, Benin, from 2 to 9 November 2025, reinforcing the bilateral defence partnership between Benin and France and contributing to regional maritime security efforts in the Gulf of Guinea.
Israeli President Isaac Herzog began his historic Central African tour this week with a state visit to Zambia, marking a symbolic and strategic milestone in Israel’s renewed engagement with Africa.
The Lake Chad Basin has become the epicentre of a deadly rivalry between Boko Haram’s JAS faction and the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP). Between 5–8 November 2025, intense clashes across strategic islands in Borno State left hundreds of fighters dead and revealed a renewed struggle for control over smuggling routes, revenue networks, and territorial dominance.
The President of India began a state visit to Angola and Botswana on 8 November 2025, as part of New Delhi’s effort to deepen engagement with key African partners.
Mali’s capital faces mounting pressures as Russian Africa Corps reinforcements continue to bolster the junta amid an ongoing “economic siege” by Jama’at Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM).
In November 2025, the UN Security Council will review the mandate of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) and the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM), both set to expire on 15 November.
In November 2025, the UN Security Council is expected to renew the mandate of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), set to expire on 15 November.
The UN Security Council will convene in November 2025 for a briefing and consultations on South Sudan, alongside the presentation of the Secretary-General’s 90-day report.
In November 2025, the UN Security Council is expected to vote on a resolution renewing the authorization for maritime inspections off the coast of Libya, allowing member states – individually or through regional organizations – to intercept and inspect vessels suspected of violating the arms embargo.
In November 2025, the UN Security Council will convene under the agenda item “Peace Consolidation in West Africa”, chaired by Julius Maada Bio, President of Sierra Leone and current Chairperson of ECOWAS.
Libya’s rival fiscal authorities are moving – under sustained UN pressure – toward limited institutional convergence after years of fragmentation that crippled state budgeting and revenue management.
As Morocco enters the final stretch of 2025, three major policy fronts — fiscal planning, defence modernization, and market regulation — are moving in rare harmony.
Tanzania’s 29 October 2025 presidential election triggered the most severe domestic unrest in years. The vote proceeded after major opposition leaders and parties were excluded; President Samia Suluhu Hassan was declared the winner and sworn in amid protests, curfews, and rolling connectivity disruptions.
Since early September, JNIM has enforced a de facto embargo on fuel entering Mali, striking convoys from Senegal, Mauritania, Guinea, and Côte d’Ivoire and burning tankers, including some under Forces Armées Maliennes (FAMa) escort.
Tanzania’s 29 October general elections have pushed the country into its most volatile moment of the multiparty era. Provisional tallies carried by state media place President Samia Suluhu Hassan and the ruling CCM on course for a decisive victory, even as major opposition figures were excluded from the ballot and protests have entered a second day.
In a formal letter dated October 24, 2025, addressed to H.E. Daniel Francisco Chapo, President of the Republic of Mozambique, TotalEnergies SE, on behalf of the Mozambique LNG co-venturers, confirmed its decision to lift the Force Majeure declared in 2021 on the Mozambique LNG project in Cabo Delgado.
On 24 October 2025, Egypt’s senior defence leadership held high-level talks with Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, reviewing bilateral defence cooperation, training, and counter-terrorism coordination.
Ethiopia has sharply criticized a joint statement issued by the EU and Egypt regarding the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), calling the EU’s position “deeply disappointing” and “one-sided.”
The Kingdom of Morocco and the Republic of Liberia have signed a new military cooperation agreement in Rabat, reinforcing their shared commitment to African-led peace and security initiatives.
At 81, President Yoweri Museveni is preparing for the 2026 election after nearly four decades in power. His administration relies on a layered security system that combines the regular armed forces, an elite presidential guard, and expanding foreign partnerships.
Nigeria and Somalia are positioning themselves as key continental actors in the fight against terrorism, championing a vision of African-led security cooperation. Their renewed partnership — strengthened through a series of high-level military summits and bilateral meetings in 2025 — underscores a continental shift toward indigenous solutions to Africa’s multifaceted security challenges.
Between October 21–22, 2025, representatives of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Rwanda, the United States, Qatar, and the African Union Commission met in Washington, D.C. for the third session of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism (JSCM).
What began as a rebellion in the highlands of North Kivu has evolved into a vast, transnational economy of war — a system that turns insecurity into income and instability into opportunity.
GI-TOC’s 2022 baseline warned that criminal trades were converging. By 2025, the convergence is complete. Once-separate supply chains have fused into hybrid economies tied together by protection networks, logistics, and laundering.
The 2025 GI-TOC mapping highlights a growing convergence between West African and Central African illicit economies, forming what analysts describe as the “Trans-Sahel–Congo Arc.” This vast geographic continuum now extends from coastal Guinea and Benin through the Sahel to eastern DRC and Cameroon, hosting more than 350 identified trafficking hubs.
The 2025 GI-TOC mapping update reveals an alarming southward drift of criminal economies from the Sahel into the coastal West African states — Ghana, Benin, Togo, and Côte d’Ivoire.
Across the Sahel, illicit economies have evolved from opportunistic exchanges into genuine financial systems under armed governance. According to the GI-TOC 2025 report, revenues from trafficking now finance insurgent, extremist and militia networks in Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso and beyond.
The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime’s 2025 update offers deeper insight into how instability spreads across West and Central Africa. Building on findings from 2022, this edition highlights 350 areas where illegal activities fuel ongoing conflicts.
The U.S.-based Flagship Gold Corp has formalized a strategic partnership with SOREM to restart production at the Morila Gold Mine — one of Mali’s most historically significant gold operations. The deal marks the first American mining investment under Mali’s new mining code, introduced in 2023 to increase transparency, enforce local content participation, and strengthen state oversight.
ASA has examined reports from Sudan War Monitor and additional sources, revealing a targeted drone airstrike in North Kordofan State that claimed the life of Paramount Chief Suleiman Jaber Jumaa Sahl, a key influencer within the Arab Majaneen tribe, alongside ten senior elders.
The DRC has signed a preliminary agreement with Hydro-Link, an affiliate of the U.S.-based Symbion Power, to construct a 1,160-kilometre high-voltage transmission line connecting Angola’s hydroelectric network to the DRC’s mineral heartland in Lualaba and Haut-Katanga provinces.
Egypt and the United Arab Emirates have inked a landmark deal to advance the Egypt–Europe electricity interconnection through Italy—a 3,000 MW subsea corridor that would carry North African renewables into Europe. With feasibility and environmental studies underway, the project is shifting from planning to pre-implementation.
The collapse of Madagascar’s President Andry Rajoelina following a youth-led uprising has sent shockwaves across the continent. The movement, Gen Z Madagascar, succeeded in forcing regime change without political parties or traditional leadership structures—an unprecedented event in African political history.
Sudan’s fragile calm has shattered once again. Overnight drone strikes on Khartoum and Omdurman on 14 October have reignited fighting in the country’s war-torn capital, two years after the conflict between rival generals plunged the nation into chaos. The SAF accuse the RSF of orchestrating the coordinated aerial assaults, threatening the modest sense of stability that had slowly returned to the capital.
In the wake of the September 2025 hospital tragedy in Agadir, which left eight pregnant women dead under what were described as “unacceptable conditions,” Morocco’s youth-led GenZ 212 collective has transformed street outrage into a calculated economic campaign of resistance.
The Great Lakes region stands at another inflection point. In the same week, two developments exposed the fragility of the regional order: the announcement of a sixth round of negotiations between the Congolese government and the AFC–M23 coalition, and President Félix Tshisekedi’s public call in Brussels for “peace among the brave,” addressed to Rwandan President Paul Kagame.
The DRC Presidency is intensifying efforts to reposition the Democratic Republic of Congo as a cornerstone of African energy transition supply chains by hosting a sequence of high-profile economic forums in Washington, D.C. These gatherings are strategically timed to coincide with major events such as the IMF/World Bank meetings and attract significant U.S. investment across sectors including mining, critical minerals, energy, infrastructure, agriculture, technology, and education.
In October 2025, leaked internal documents from Russia’s state defence conglomerate Rostec — disclosed by the hacker collective Black Mirror — confirmed one of the most consequential defence deals in recent African history: Algeria’s acquisition of 12 Su-57E stealth fighters, the export variant of Russia’s fifth-generation combat aircraft.
The Republic of Guinea has officially launched extraction operations at Simandou, the world’s largest untapped iron ore deposit — marking the culmination of nearly 30 years of anticipation, disputes, and stalled negotiations.
As global trade routes face disruptions from geopolitical tensions and logistics crises, the Gulf of Guinea is rapidly emerging as a strategic alternative corridor linking Atlantic Africa to global supply chains.
Canadian-listed Ivanhoe Mines Ltd. has reported record zinc output at its Kipushi Mine in Haut-Katanga Province, marking a historic resurgence in the DRC’s mining sector. The announcement, coupled with strong copper performance at Kamoa-Kakula, confirms the country’s robust production base and its central role in global critical-minerals supply chains.
Tanzania is approaching its October 2025 general elections amid growing concern over the shrinking space for political opposition, the media, and civil society. While the country remains stable and the ruling Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) retains broad institutional control, recent developments—including the detention of key opposition figures and new restrictions on digital communication—suggest that the electoral process is becoming increasingly constrained.
Council in October: Briefing on the Secretary-General’s report by SRSG Valentine Rugwabiza (MINUSCA). Focus: electoral preparations, peace process, and security conditions. Elections: Presidential/parliamentary polls scheduled for 28 December; municipal elections also planned for the first time in nearly 40 years. Both face logistical, financial, and security hurdles.
Council in October: 60-day Libya briefing by SRSG Hanna Serwaa Tetteh; renewal of UNSMIL mandate (expires 31 Oct). Politics: National roadmap tabled; rivalry between GNU (Tripoli) and GNS/HoR (East, backed by LNA) persists; municipal elections progressed in parts of the West despite attempted disruption and suspensions elsewhere.
Council focus (October): Biannual briefing by Huang Xia on implementation of the 2013 Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSC-F) and regional de-escalation.
In October, the UN Security Council (UNSC) is scheduled to receive the Secretary-General’s annual report on Western Sahara and to deliberate on the renewal of the mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), which expires on 31 October 2025.
In October 2025, the UNSC will hold a private meeting to review the situation in Somalia, focusing on the transition of the UN Transitional Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNTMIS), the evolving threat posed by Al-Shabaab, and the implementation of the AU Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM).
In October, the UNSC will convene a high-level briefing on cooperation between the AU, with a focus on operationalizing a whole-of-continuum approach—from prevention and mediation to peace support operations (PSOs), peacebuilding, and post-conflict recovery. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga, Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) to the AU and Head of the UN Office to the AU (UNOAU), is expected to brief members and present the Secretary-General’s annual report on strengthening the UN–AU partnership in Africa.
The African Air Expo 2025 represents a landmark aviation event designed to connect the global aerospace industry with South Africa and the wider continent. The Expo provides a high-level platform where industry leaders, government representatives, operators, manufacturers, and investors converge to foster collaboration, explore opportunities, and promote long-term trade partnerships.
The EDEX 2025, held under the patronage of President Abdel Fattah El Sisi, is the region’s premier defence and security showcase. Taking place from 1–4 December 2025 in Cairo, the biennial event reaffirms Egypt’s role as a strategic hub for defence cooperation in Africa and the Middle East.
The U.S. administration has endorsed a one-year renewal of the AGOA, a 25-year-old trade pact granting duty-free access to the U.S. market for eligible Sub-Saharan African countries. Originally set to expire at the end of September 2025, the short-term extension avoids immediate disruption but underscores growing uncertainty around Washington’s long-term Africa trade strategy.
Russia has signed a sweeping cooperation agreement with Sudan covering transport infrastructure, civil aviation, financial training, and expanded commodity trade. This accord goes far beyond technical cooperation—it embeds Moscow deeper into Sudan’s state systems at a moment when the country is weakened by civil war, economic collapse, and diplomatic isolation.
Terrorist Financing (TF) in Mozambique is systematic, deliberate, and regionally embedded. Between 2017 and 2024, over 458.6 million meticais (~USD 7 million) were mobilized through fragmented deposits, structured withdrawals, and layered transfers across banking and mobile money systems. These flows sustained recruitment, logistics, and insurgent operations in Cabo Delgado.
The government of Niger has formally unveiled its intent to develop a civilian nuclear energy program in partnership with Russia’s Rosatom. Following high-level meetings in Moscow, authorities confirmed the adoption of a technical cooperation track and feasibility roadmap. This initiative is presented as a strategic pillar for Niger’s long-term energy security, aiming to diversify electricity production beyond diesel and hydro dependence.
Taiwan has suspended its planned restrictions on semiconductor exports to South Africa, just days after announcing them. The measure had been introduced in response to Pretoria’s decision—under pressure from Beijing—to downgrade and relocate Taiwan’s representative office. The suspension reflects Taipei’s hesitation to use its world-leading chip industry as a blunt instrument in diplomatic disputes.
Kenya has confirmed that it is working to finalize a bilateral trade agreement with the United States by the end of 2025 while simultaneously lobbying for a five-year extension of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). This dual approach is framed as critical for safeguarding existing export markets and positioning the country as a competitive investment hub in East Africa.
Despite the WHO’s September 2025 announcement ending the designation of Mpox as a “Public Health Emergency of International Concern,” West Africa continues to face a complex and deteriorating epidemiological situation. Multiple states are reporting fresh outbreaks, resurgent clusters, or evidence of local transmission. The region’s porous borders, high mobility, and fragile surveillance infrastructure are amplifying risks of transnational spread.
The Republic of Chad and the Republic of Cameroon are seeking to intensify their bilateral defence cooperation in response to persistent cross-border security threats. During a high-level meeting in Yaoundé, Chadian Minister of the Armed Forces Issakha Maloua Djamouss, alongside his Cameroonian counterpart and senior officers, reaffirmed the strong ties between N’Djamena and Yaoundé, under the leadership of President Paul Biya and Marshal Mahamat Idriss Déby Itno.
At a recent bilateral forum, South Africa and China deepened their investment ties, flagging new capital commitments in mining and energy. Beijing also reiterated its readiness to extend expanded zero-tariff access for selected South African exports, particularly in agriculture and raw minerals.
In September 2025, two critical African Union–led processes took place in Kenya, underscoring Africa’s drive to recalibrate its governance, peace, and security architectures while advancing integrated border management.
The Republic of Congo has tabled a mid-term budget revision, reallocating resources toward infrastructure and public health. This shift is intended to address long-standing gaps in service delivery while stimulating job creation and resilience in key sectors. The revised framework signals an effort to align spending with medium-term development priorities rather than short-term consumption.
India’s Tata Advanced Systems has inaugurated an armoured-vehicle manufacturing facility near Casablanca, representing a major milestone in Morocco’s defence-industrial ambitions.
Since early 2025, the Beninese Armed Forces (FAB) have undertaken a sustained military campaign in northern Benin aimed at countering the growing threat posed by jihadist groups affiliated with the JNIM. These operations mark a significant change in the security landscape, reflecting both improved intelligence gathering and a more assertive operational posture by Benin’s security apparatus.
The International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) has issued an emergency appeal to contain a new Ebola outbreak in Kasai, central DRC. Health facilities in the region are already overstretched by displacement crises and recurrent epidemics, leaving the system vulnerable to collapse without immediate intervention.
Africa has entrenched itself as a critical node in global cocaine trafficking. West Africa has evolved into a strategic transshipment hub, driven by alliances between Balkan/Albanian criminal groups, South American cartels (notably Brazil’s Primeiro Comando da Capital, PCC), and local intermediaries. Simultaneously, East Africa, particularly Kenya, is transforming from a transit stop into both a logistics hub and a growing consumption market.
Recent testimony before the Madlanga Commission of Inquiry has exposed new layers of organized crime penetration into South Africa’s security and justice institutions. Allegations implicate senior police commanders, prosecutors, elements of the judiciary, and political officeholders in activities ranging from deliberate obstruction of investigations to collusion with syndicates engaged in narcotics, extortion, political killings, and cross-border trafficking.
On 17 September 2025, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to extend Zambia’s $1.3 billion Extended Credit Facility (ECF) until January 2026. This decision prevents the immediate collapse of the program but leaves Zambia with a narrow window to advance long-delayed debt reforms. The extension also sharpens international attention on Lusaka’s ability to deliver, as creditors, donors, and investors seek evidence of real progress.
A new legislative proposal in the United States directly links the lifting of sanctions on Zimbabwe to the government’s willingness to provide compensation for land expropriated from white farmers during the country’s controversial land reform program. The bill reflects Washington’s continued emphasis on property rights and accountability, while placing Harare under renewed pressure to address one of the most politically sensitive issues in its modern history.
Zapad-2025 was a Russian - Belarusian military exercise held in Belarus from 12–16 September 2025, with over 20 foreign participants. African states including Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and the Republic of the Congo joined as contingents or observers, indicating a shift in their defence partnerships and alignment away from Western models.
DRC is entering United Nations General Assembly (UNGA 2025) with a bold message: it intends to position itself as a cornerstone of the global green transition. Holding over 70% of the world’s cobalt reserves and significant deposits of copper, lithium, and rare earths, the DRC’s role in global supply chains for electric vehicles, renewable energy, and digital infrastructure is unmatched.
The recent visit of U.S. Special Operations Commander Gen. Michael Tudor to Algiers underscored Washington’s intent to expand counterterrorism cooperation in North Africa. Discussions were cordial and pragmatic, with both sides acknowledging shared concerns over regional instability. Yet, as in past encounters, Algerian officials stopped short of any commitment that might evolve into a formal alliance. This cautious approach reflects Algeria’s long-standing foreign policy principles: non-alignment, sovereignty, and strategic autonomy.
Egypt has finalized a landmark agreement with Israel for the construction of the Nitzana pipeline, which will deliver 600 million cubic feet per day of natural gas from Israel’s Leviathan field. Valued at around $35 billion, the initiative is designed to relieve Egypt’s domestic energy shortages, cut reliance on costly LNG imports, and reinforce Cairo’s ambition to serve as a regional energy hub.
Malawi heads to the polls in one of its most consequential elections in decades. The contest pits incumbent President Lazarus Chakwera against former President Peter Mutharika, with both candidates seeking to convince voters they can rescue the country from an economic crisis that has reached historic proportions.
African trade ministers convened in Cairo to accelerate the AfCFTA agenda, emphasizing that the agreement must move from political declaration to operational reality. Despite AfCFTA’s promise as the world’s largest free trade bloc by membership, intra-African trade remains stuck at just 14–15% of total commerce—far below regional integration levels achieved in Asia or Europe.
Forces loyal to Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar have initiated a strategic redeployment in southern Libya, consolidating their presence in Sabha, Traghen, and across the sensitive tri-border area with Algeria and Niger.
Illegal artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM) is a defining feature of West Africa’s shadow economy. It sustains livelihoods while simultaneously fuelling criminality, insurgency financing, and governance breakdown. Women are at the centre of this economy — yet their participation is invisible, their protection inadequate, their exclusion entrenched, and their role in recovery consistently overlooked.
The Dangote Refinery represents a landmark in Nigeria’s industrial ambitions. With a $20 billion investment, it is designed to end decades of fuel import dependency, stabilize domestic supply, and project Nigeria as a regional exporter of refined products.
Tanzania is entering its October 2025 general elections in a climate of relative calm but rising political tension. The ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) is widely expected to retain power under President Samia Suluhu Hassan.
Tunisia is pursuing a two-pronged strategy to secure its future: expanding economic integration with African markets while simultaneously modernizing its defence capabilities. On one hand, Tunis seeks to leverage the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) and a logistics corridor through Libya to become a hub linking Europe with Sub-Saharan Africa.
Between 28 August and 10 September 2025, Egypt hosted Bright Star 2025, the largest multinational military exercise in the Middle East. Conducted at the Mohamed Naguib base with participation from 43 countries and more than 8,000 troops, the exercise confirmed Egypt’s role as a central player in regional security architecture.
African jihadist networks across the Sahel, Central Africa and the Horn of Africa are increasingly leveraging commercial satellite broadband—most visibly Starlink—to overcome traditional connectivity constraints. Starlink’s portable terminals give militants the capacity to maintain near-continuous, high-bandwidth communications from remote sanctuaries, dramatically improving command-and-control, media outreach, and cross-border coordination.
Algeria is redrawing its economic map. Once heavily tied to France, its former colonial power, Algiers is now cultivating Italy as its preferred partner in energy, trade, and infrastructure. This realignment reflects both pragmatic considerations—Europe’s demand for secure gas post-Ukraine crisis, Italy’s ambition to become a Mediterranean energy hub—as well as deeper political shifts marked by lingering Franco-Algerian mistrust.
The DRC sits at the centre of the global energy transition, yet governance failures and overlapping legal disputes threaten to blunt its advantages. On September 9–10, 2025, President Félix Tshisekedi undertook a state visit to Astana, Kazakhstan.
On the night of 24–25 August 2025, an armed incursion struck the farming hamlet of Difita in Téhini department, near the Burkinabè border. Around 2 a.m., unidentified gunmen opened fire on residents. The toll is severe: four civilians killed, one person missing, a woman severely burned, multiple homes set ablaze, destroyed crops, and stolen livestock.
Following the fall of Bukavu in February 2025, Uvira has become the administrative and military pivot of South Kivu. Provincial authorities relocated here, while FARDC, supported by Burundian Defence Forces and Wazalendo militias, entrenched defensive positions. African Security Analysis (ASA) assesses Uvira as a critical node in the eastern DRC conflict, with its unique geography amplifying both its strategic importance and its vulnerabilities.
The Central African Republic (CAR) remains entrenched in a complex security environment, characterised by persistent armed group activity, cross-border spillover from neighbouring conflicts, and ongoing efforts at disarmament and reconciliation. From mid-July to mid-August 2025, CAR witnessed a mixture of cautious progress and deepening vulnerabilities.
This report explains how three interlinked engagements in August 2025 can move the African Union from episodic coordination toward a genuinely integrated, continent-wide system for early warning and early action.
Qatar is stepping up its presence in Central and Southern Africa with an ambitious economic diplomacy drive. Spearheaded by Sheikh Al Mansour bin Jabor bin Jassim Al Thani and a multi-sector business delegation, the initiative signals investments of unprecedented scale: over $20 billion for the DRC and between $5 and $10 billion for other countries in the region.
India is realigning crude procurement away from Russian barrels under intensified U.S. political–economic pressure and new tariff exposure.
The rainy season no longer slows the violence in Burkina Faso. Between 8 and 11 August 2025, the realities on the ground starkly contradicted official narratives. A video emerged showing 21 soldiers captured at Foutouri urging negotiations for their release.
ASA assessment identifies the Trump administration’s 2025 policy toward Somalia and its federal member states as heavily focused on counterterrorism operations, strategic hedging in the Horn of Africa, and selective engagement with semi-autonomous territories such as Somaliland and Puntland.
Recent developments indicate that tensions between Eritrea and Ethiopia are escalating, raising concerns over the potential for renewed hostilities in the Horn of Africa. Ethiopia’s ruling Prosperity Party recently accused unspecified external actors of attempting to provoke conflict—a charge it has frequently levelled in ways that implicitly implicate Eritrea.
On Monday, August 11, 2025, the United States and Sudan conducted discreet high-level talks in Switzerland, marking the first substantive engagement between the two governments since the change of the U.S. administration. This meeting comes nearly a year after Sudan’s military government boycotted a U.S.-mediated peace summit in the same country, signalling a cautious recalibration in bilateral relations.
ASA has observed a renewed surge in Al-Shabaab’s operational tempo and territorial consolidation in Somalia between July 1 and August 5, 2025. The militant group, affiliated with Al-Qaeda, continues to exploit political disunity, weakened military capacity, and humanitarian vulnerabilities to extend its influence across strategic corridors in central and southern Somalia.
The Security Council will take up the West Africa and Sahel file in mid-August under Panama’s presidency. The open briefing—followed by closed consultations—will feature Special Representative Leonardo Santos Simão (UNOWAS), UN-Women Executive Director Sima Sami Bahous, and a Sahelian civil-society advocate still to be confirmed. Panama has requested all briefers to treat Women, Peace and Security (WPS) as a cross-cutting lens, linking women’s protection and participation to counterterrorism, governance and humanitarian policy.
The Council will convene its bimonthly meeting on Libya in August. Special Representative Hanna Serwaa Tetteh will brief on the Secretary-General’s latest report and on UNSMIL’s activities, after which the chair of the 1970 Libya Sanctions Committee will present the committee’s work. Closed consultations will follow.
In August, the Council will receive a briefing—followed by closed consultations—on South Sudan. Special Representative Nicholas Haysom will present the Secretary-General’s 90-day report on UNMISS. The mission’s mandate is set to expire 30 April 2026.
On 18–19 July 2025, maritime units belonging to the Puntland administration boarded and detained the Comoros-flagged cargo vessel MV Sea World after it anchored without prior clearance off Bareeda on Somalia’s northeastern coast.
On 29 July 2025 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is expected to adopt, by unanimous vote, a draft resolution that prolongs all sanctions targeting armed groups in the Central African Republic (CAR) until 31 July 2026 and extends the mandate of the Panel of Experts that monitors these measures until 31 August 2026.
Sudan’s civil war has left the smoking ruins of Khartoum behind and now rages across the dusty plains of Kordofan. The Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), buoyed by their hard-won victory in the capital, are pressing west in the hope of reopening the Omdurman–El Obeid highway and smashing the Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) foothold in Darfur. The RSF—financed by Abu Dhabi and reinforced by foreign fighters from as far afield as Colombia and South Sudan—has counter-attacked with equal determination.
Washington is trying to regain traction in the Sahel after a bruising few years. The coup in Niger, the loss of its Agadez drone hub, and an influx of Russian “security contractors” forced U.S. planners back to square one. Last week, Deputy Assistant-Secretary William B. Stevens touched down in Bamako with a message: the United States is back—but this time it’s selling more than counterterrorism.
Mali is undergoing a dangerous transformation: what began as a domestic counterinsurgency campaign is now deeply entangled in a volatile mix of ethnic persecution, foreign mercenary activity, and international legal violations.
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) faces a growing disconnect between strong macroeconomic performance and deteriorating public financial management. While mineral exports and revenue gains support short-term growth, rising emergency expenditures, weak procurement oversight, and stalled reforms are placing the fiscal system under strain.
On July19, 2025, at approximately 16:00 local time, two military positions of Burkina Faso’s Defence and Security Forces (FDS) in Djibo—a strategic town in Soum province—were attacked by armed insurgents.
Two days after the 34ᵗʰ Policy Organs Meeting of the Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF) closed in Mogadishu, Eastern Africa remains on a knife-edge. Ministers returned home with an ambitious five-year roadmap just as the region confronts its gravest cluster of crises in decades: Sudan’s civil war, an expanded rebel front in eastern DRC, Somalia’s precarious transition, and South Sudan’s stalled peace process.
Recent insurgent violence in the Irumu territory of Ituri province has resulted in at least 34 civilian deaths. These attacks, carried out by suspected ADF/ISCAP militants, appear as calculated reprisals to the ongoing joint military operations of the FARDC and the UPDF. While the military claims operational successes, the insurgents’ ability to swiftly execute counterattacks highlights ongoing strategic vulnerabilities within the current security framework.
As global tensions rise and regional fault lines shift, the three North African nations of Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya are embarking on distinct but converging paths to modernize their armed forces. Their respective strategies reflect urgent security needs, complex geopolitical alignments, and long-term goals of military self-reliance.
Madrid reaffirmed its strategic interest in Africa on July 5, 2025, by hosting the Africa-Spain Summit under the theme “A New Horizon for Africa-Spain Cooperation.” This high-level gathering brought together African heads of state, ministers, business leaders, Spanish government officials, and international stakeholders to redefine the contours of a balanced, forward-looking partnership.
On July 9, 2025, Sierra Leone will lead a timely and politically significant Arria-formula meeting at the United Nations under the theme: “The Global Race for Critical Minerals: Addressing Resource-Driven Insecurity in Africa.”
The ADF, currently operating under the Islamic State Central Africa Province (IS-CAP) banner, remain a persistent security challenge in Central and East Africa. Originating in Uganda and now deeply embedded in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the group has evolved beyond conventional insurgency tactics. Among its more sophisticated methods is the strategic use of infiltration—targeting national military institutions and international actors alike.
The Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), initially a Ugandan insurgent group formed in the mid-1990s, have since evolved into one of the most lethal and structurally complex militant organizations in the Great Lakes region. Since pledging allegiance to the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP), the group has undergone a strategic metamorphosis—consolidating its religious radicalism, expanding its financial and logistical networks, and embedding operatives within Congolese military and civilian institutions.
This report examines the security situation in western Niger following a series of coordinated attacks carried out by Katiba Hanifa, an armed faction affiliated with Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM)—a core Al-Qaeda-linked coalition active across the central Sahel. The events analysed here fall within the intersecting domains of terrorism, civilian targeting, governance vulnerability, and economic infrastructure security, all unfolding in one of the Sahel's most strategically sensitive zones: the Tillabéri region.
The global energy transition and rising technological competition have triggered a worldwide race for critical minerals. In 2024, Chinese mining acquisitions abroad surged to their highest level in more than a decade. With traditional Western jurisdictions (such as Canada, the U.S., and Australia) becoming less receptive to Chinese capital in strategic sectors, Africa has emerged as Beijing’s prime theatre for securing mineral access.
In late June 2025, under the mediation of the United States, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda signed a peace agreement in Washington aimed at ending ongoing hostilities in the eastern region of the DRC. A key provision of the agreement calls for Kinshasa to commit to the neutralization of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), an armed group composed in part of former participants in the 1994 Rwandan genocide.
Ahead of President Joseph Boakai’s scheduled participation in a high-level U.S.-Africa summit in Washington, D.C. (July 9–11, 2025), concerns have emerged within the diaspora and civil society about the potential for Liberia to enter into extractive resource agreements under uncertain or non-transparent conditions. A Canada-based Liberian activist has publicly warned against what he termed “bogus” mineral contracts that could emerge from negotiations conducted without proper public oversight or strategic alignment with Liberia’s long-term interests.
On 26 June 2025, the UN Security Council convened an open briefing, subsequently moving into closed consultations to discuss the ongoing challenges facing the Central African Republic (CAR). The briefing, presented by Jean-Pierre Lacroix, UN Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, drew from the Secretary-General’s latest report (S/2025/383) covering developments from 13 February to 13 June 2025. Representatives from the CAR government participated under Rule 37 of the Council’s provisional rules.
On 30 June, the UN Security Council is set to vote on a draft resolution aimed at renewing the sanctions regime on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) established under Resolution 1533. This renewal will extend sanctions until 1 July 2026 and prolong the mandate of the Group of Experts assisting the 1533 DRC Sanctions Committee until 1 August 2026.
Since the launch of Operation Shujaa in November 2021, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Uganda have engaged in a formal military partnership aimed at dismantling the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)—also known as the Moudjahidines of the Holy City of Madina (MTM)—and their regional affiliate, the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP).
The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) risks making a strategic error by directly engaging in the complex and informal relationship between Uganda and Rwanda. This relationship isn't built on formal treaties, trade agreements, or institutional alignment. Instead, it is shaped by historical ties, informal wartime alliances, shared security concerns, and personal connections — a mix of emotional and often unclear relationships that go beyond traditional diplomacy.
As of late June 2025, the Program of Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, and Community Stabilization (PDDRCS) remains only marginally active on the ground, confined largely to symbolic gestures rather than systemic intervention.
In early May, tensions rose in Mali as over 100 political parties and civil society groups protested in Bamako against a proposal to dissolve political parties and extend the rule of General Assimi Goïta for five more years without elections. Demonstrators demanded immediate elections and denounced authoritarianism.
In June 2025, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) abruptly banned all cobalt concentrate exports. The government hoped this move would increase state revenues, curb smuggling, and encourage local refining. However, the ban was launched without the legal framework, oversight, or infrastructure needed to make it work.
This report by Africa Security Analysis provides a U.S.-focused strategic assessment of the 2025 U.S.–Africa Business Summit in Luanda (June 22–25). It examines Washington’s efforts to deepen economic engagement in Africa amid growing competition from China’s entrenched Belt and Road Initiative (BRI/OBOR).
General Muhoozi Kainerugaba, born in 1974, is the son of President Yoweri Museveni and has served as Uganda’s Chief of Defence Forces (CDF) since March 2024. A graduate of Sandhurst, he is a career military officer who quickly ascended through the ranks of the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF).
A recent panel discussion moderated by Johnny Gas (Invest Africa) has laid bare a sobering reality: despite extensive partnership rhetoric, Africa remains a low priority in the second administration of President Trump’s foreign policy agenda.
In recent months, the Sahel has seen a sharp escalation in jihadist activity. Major strikes targeting military outposts and civilian areas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have claimed hundreds of lives and displaced tens of thousands.
On June 10, 2025, the European Commission updated its "list of high-risk third countries" for combating money laundering and terrorist financing (AML/CFT). This review reveals two contrasting trajectories in West Africa
In recent weeks, JNIM has significantly intensified its campaign across the Sahel, particularly in Burkina Faso and Mali. A series of large-scale, coordinated attacks and strategic propaganda efforts suggest a broader objective that extends beyond battlefield victories.
South Africa and Canada are seeking to strengthen their bilateral cooperation, with a focus on multilateral engagement and a shared commitment to climate action and energy transition. As both countries play key roles on the global stage—South Africa currently chairs the G20, while Canada leads the G7—they are aligning efforts to build a more inclusive, green, and equitable future.
Japan–Africa relations are poised at a transformative juncture with the forthcoming TICAD 9 (The Ninth Tokyo International Conference on African Development) in Yokohama. Set for August 20–22, 2025, this conference arrives amidst expanding opportunities and persistent structural challenges, marking a critical turning point in bilateral engagement.
For years, Thebe Ikalafeng played a pivotal role in elevating global giants like Colgate and Nike. Today, however, his mission has shifted toward empowering African brands to claim the cultural resonance, loyalty, and visibility that international powerhouses have long dominated on the continent.
The eastern regions of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are once again at the epicentre of a mounting crisis, marked by escalating armed conflict, stalled diplomatic efforts, and urgent political manoeuvring.
The global tin market is undergoing a significant transformation, driven by strategic investments, intensifying geopolitical competition, and the urgent need to secure critical mineral supplies essential for modern industries.
The Kayes region in western Mali—and its surrounding areas—has become the stage for an unprecedented escalation in the targeting of economic sites by jihadist groups. This development carries significant strategic implications regarding the conflict’s nature and its regional and international scope.
Since the early 2010s, Boko Haram—and its northern offshoot, Islamic State’s West Africa Province (ISWAP)—has diversified its funding beyond ransom kidnappings and extortion. By infiltrating artisanal mining, charcoal production, wildlife trafficking and fuel smuggling, the insurgent network generates substantial revenue to sustain its operations.
Since 2015, Burkina Faso has been embroiled in a worsening conflict with Islamist insurgents, primarily in its northern and eastern regions bordering Mali and Niger. The insurgency, initially a spillover from Mali’s 2012 civil war, has grown in scope and intensity, with groups like JNIM, the ISGS, and the homegrown Ansaroul Islam exploiting local grievances, ethnic tensions, and weak governance.
The recent diplomatic tour by UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Shakhbout bin Nahyan Al Nahyan, to Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger underscores Abu Dhabi’s growing ambition to assert its geopolitical presence in the Sahel.
Somalia continues to grapple with a complex and volatile security environment, marked by persistent threats from Al-Shabaab, ongoing military operations, and emerging regional tensions. Over the past two weeks, from May 5 to May 21, 2025, the country has witnessed significant security developments, including intensified militant activities, targeted assassinations, and international responses to the deteriorating situation.
Erik Prince, the founder of the Private Military Company Blackwater, has re-emerged as a significant figure in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) through agreements aimed at securing and taxing the country's vast mineral wealth.
On 16 May 2025, during a closed-door session at the Bamako Commercial Court, the Malian State clashed with Barrick Mining (formerly Barrick Gold) over the future of the Loulo-Gounkoto gold complex. The Malian government is now seeking to place the mine under provisional administration amid disputes concerning the application of the August 2023 mining code, allegations of tax under-payment, and the November 2024 seizure of approximately three tonnes of gold.
In May 2025, Russia and Tanzania reinvigorated their longstanding ties—rooted in Cold War solidarity—by convening high-level meetings in St. Petersburg. During sessions of the Intergovernmental Russia–Tanzania Commission on Trade and Economic Cooperation, both sides reviewed past achievements, confronted current hurdles, and set strategic priorities for the future.
On 19 May, the UN Security Council will hold a private meeting to discuss the rapidly deteriorating political, security, and humanitarian situation in Sudan. The meeting, convened at the request of Greece, which holds the Council presidency for May, follows mounting concern among Council members over the escalating violence. Briefings will be delivered by Ramtane Lamamra, the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy for Sudan, and Lisa Doughten, Director of the Humanitarian Financing and Resource Mobilization Division at the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).
Under the framework of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation and the Belt and Road Initiative, Sino-African agricultural engagements have achieved remarkable advances that bolster food security and orient farms toward modern, market-driven practices.
On Friday morning, 16 May 2025, the UN Security Council will hold closed consultations to address a recent spike in violence among armed groups in Tripoli. The meeting, requested by the United Kingdom (the Council’s Libya penholder), France, and the United States, will feature a briefing from Hanna Serwaa Tetteh, the UN Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Libya and head of UNSMIL.
DRC has faced significant challenges in its electoral processes, marked by a series of controversial elections, where corruption has undermined the legitimacy of results. Electoral corruption in the DRC takes many forms, including vote-buying, manipulation of voter lists, and the misuse of state resources for political purposes. The pervasive nature of these issues has not only led to a loss of public trust but also fuelled political instability, which continues to hinder the country’s democratic development.
China’s expanding footprint across Africa reflects a deliberate strategy to deepen economic ties and project influence in the Global South. While Beijing’s investments have opened new development avenues for the continent, this engagement is increasingly complicated by political pushback, reputational challenges, and mounting security concerns—especially for Chinese nationals on the ground.
Since April 2023, Sudan has been mired in a brutal conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The fighting has precipitated a series of atrocities and sparked a humanitarian catastrophe, revealing not only a collapse in state control but also the chilling emergence of systematic violence against civilians.
Since early May 2025, northern Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province has witnessed a sharp escalation in insurgent violence, triggering widespread displacement and endangering key economic projects. Despite joint operations involving Mozambican and Rwandan forces, Islamist militants continue to exploit security gaps, prompting urgent humanitarian and strategic responses both on the ground and at the regional level.
DRC is currently engaged in peace negotiations taking place in cities such as Doha, Washington, and Dar es Salaam. While these international venues reflect a growing global interest in resolving the conflict, some observers have raised concerns that the relocation of talks outside Congolese territory may reduce Kinshasa’s direct influence in shaping the outcomes. Critics argue that external mediators, while contributing diplomatic resources, may also bring interests that go beyond peacebuilding alone.
In May 2025, the United States signed a formal letter of intent with Trinity Metals and Nathan Trotter & Co. to establish a direct tin supply chain from Rwanda to American smelters. Presented as a strategic move to bolster national security and reduce reliance on volatile supply routes, this agreement fits into Washington’s broader critical-minerals agenda. However, its geopolitical significance reaches far beyond trade logistics.
Since the beginning of 2025, American policy in Africa has undergone a dramatic shift. With downsized embassy staff, significant cuts to aid programs, and a realignment of military forces, Washington is concentrating its resources on counterterrorism, health surveillance, and the trade of essential minerals. This strategic pivot has created a vacuum that Moscow and Beijing are quick to exploit.
Since the outbreak of full-scale hostilities in April 2023, Sudan’s RSF have relentlessly expanded their use of unmanned aerial vehicles, transformed the tactical landscape and extended the reach of violence far beyond traditional battlefields. In early May 2025 alone, the conflict entered a new phase of intensity and scale.
Niger’s military-led government has abruptly ended its intelligence cooperation agreements with Russia and Turkey, signalling a major shift in its security strategy. The move reflects growing frustration within the ruling CNSP over the inefficacy of foreign surveillance support, mounting operational setbacks, and intensifying internal pressure that have exposed critical weaknesses in the country’s intelligence and defence systems.
On the morning of Monday, 12 May, the Security Council will hold closed consultations at the request of Somalia—an elected Council member for the 2025–2026 term—and the United Kingdom, which serves as penholder on the file. These consultations will focus exclusively on the funding arrangements for the African Union Support and Stabilization Mission in Somalia (AUSSOM); no briefing is scheduled.
On Madagascar’s northwest coast, a rare-earth initiative is rapidly emerging as a project of international significance. Harena, a leading mining company, is advancing its prefeasibility study to develop the exceptional Ampasindava deposit—an asset rich in neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, and terbium.
For several months, northeastern Nigeria has been gripped by a surge in jihadist violence, with over 100 people killed in April 2025 alone. Borno State remains at the heart of a conflict that has claimed more than 40,000 lives and displaced 2 million people, also affecting neighbouring Yobe and Adamawa States.
In May, the UN Security Council is expected to adopt a resolution renewing for one year the authorisation allowing member states, acting individually or through regional organisations, to inspect vessels on the high seas off Libya suspected of breaching the UN arms embargo. This authorisation, which expires on 31 May, has been renewed annually since 2016.
In May, the UN Security Council is expected to vote on a draft resolution to extend the sanctions regime on South Sudan, set to expire on 31 May, and to renew the mandate of the Panel of Experts assisting the 2206 South Sudan Sanctions Committee, whose current mandate expires on 1 July.
Mali's security crisis deepened in the final week of April 2025, reflecting the country’s ongoing struggles with jihadist violence, internal unrest, and regional instability. Under military rule since 2021, Mali remains trapped in a worsening cycle of conflict, further complicated by weakened international support and diplomatic friction. Below is a summary of key developments during this turbulent period.
The eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has long been a region plagued by conflict, but the security situation in the last weeks of early 2025 has deteriorated to alarming levels.
The failure of the talks held in Doha between the Congolese government and representatives of the M23/AFC confirms the deadlock of an already moribund diplomatic process. This impasse comes at a time when the balance of power on the ground clearly favours the rebellion, which continues to consolidate its military positions in North Kivu.
The Hungarian Ministry of Defence recently announced that Hungarian troops will soon join a joint military training exercise with their Chadian counterparts.
Northern Benin is facing an alarming surge in jihadist violence that is reshaping the security dynamics of coastal West Africa. A series of deadly attacks—ranging from ambushes in protected reserves to assaults on military installations—highlights the increasing presence of extremist groups operating beyond their traditional Sahelian strongholds. Benin, once viewed as a bastion of stability, is now a frontline state in the fight against the southward spread of jihadist insurgency.
Recent revelations about recruitment efforts by Sahel-based jihadist groups in Côte d’Ivoire highlight a worrying trend: the extension of the terrorist threat toward the coastal states of the Gulf of Guinea. Among the most active actors is the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM/GSIM), affiliated with Al-Qaeda, which is leading this strategy of territorial projection beyond the Sahel.
On 16 April, the United Nations Security Council convened an open briefing, followed by closed consultations, to address the situation in the Great Lakes region. The meeting featured a briefing by Mr. Huang Xia, Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, who presented the Secretary-General’s latest biannual report on the implementation of the 2013 Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSC-F) for the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the region. The report, dated 1 April, covered developments between 16 September 2024 and 27 March 2025. The Executive Director of UNICEF, Ms. Catherine Russell, also delivered a briefing.
April 18, 2025, marks a turning point for cooperation between Niger and Nigeria. After several months of tension and allegations of destabilization, both countries are now experiencing a dual thrust: on one hand, a diplomatic rapprochement welcomed by Niamey, and on the other, joint military operations aimed at neutralizing terrorist strongholds in the Lake Chad region.
Long overlooked in the chessboard of global power, the southwest Indian Ocean — encompassing the Mozambique Channel and its African coastlines — has emerged as one of the world's most hotly contested zones. Energy security, maritime control, military projection, space diplomacy, and access to critical resources are all converging in this region. Global and regional powers are recalibrating their positions, while African states seek to convert their strategic exposure into a source of sovereign strength.
Nestled along the shores of Lake Tanganyika, the strategic city of Uvira now finds itself on the edge. Since early 2025, M23 rebel forces, supported by the Congo River Alliance, have gradually tightened their grip on this once-thriving hub of 726,000 residents. Once a bustling commercial centre, Uvira has become a frontline battlefield where the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC), backed by local Wazalendo militias and Burundian reinforcements, are fighting a desperate rear-guard action. Amidst this turmoil, the local civilian population, caught in the crossfire, endures the heaviest toll. A Blistering Offensive The situation took a dramatic turn on February 18 when M23 forces seized Kamanyola, a locality 75 kilometres north of Uvira, inflicting a severe blow on FARDC forces and forcing them to retreat. Within 24 hours, Uvira plunged into chaos—gunfire echoed through the streets, looting erupted, and over 500 prisoners staged a dramatic escape from Mulunge prison. Faced with mounting violence, thousands of residents fled toward neighbouring Burundi or sought refuge in relatively safer towns like Kalemie and Moba, leaving behind only about 20% of the population in a city that increasingly resembles a ghost town. Internal Fractures and Fratricidal Clashes By February 25, internal discord erupted as infighting broke out between FARDC and their Wazalendo allies, resulting in 20 deaths and 60 wounded. Although the Wazalendo managed to temporarily reclaim positions such as the Kaziba chiefdom, the relentless advance of M23 forces continued unabated. Village after village in the Uvira highlands fell under rebel control, and defections from local militias further undermined an already fragile defence. Burundi Steps In In a bid to stem the rebel tide, Burundi—an ally of Kinshasa—deployed troops across the Ruizi River into Luvungi. However, the intervention has only added to the uncertainty: questions remain about the ability of these reinforcements to halt the M23 advance amid persistent suspicions of covert support from Rwanda. The situation on the ground remains volatile, with the ultimate outcome still unknown. A Deepening Humanitarian Crisis As the fighting intensifies, the humanitarian situation worsens. Hospitals are overwhelmed by the influx of wounded, while markets, pharmacies, and banks remain shuttered. Civilians left in the lurch find themselves trapped in a desperate struggle between fleeing and merely trying to survive, with scant help or hope of escape. The Noose Tightens By April 2025, anxiety in the region had reached a fever pitch. In a massive redeployment along the Bukavu–Uvira axis observed between April 11 and 16, M23/AFC forces appear to be gearing up for the capture of Uvira, with a potential further push toward Kalemie on the horizon. This military buildup is fanning widespread fear among the population, especially in light of past abuses in rebel-controlled areas and comes despite diplomatic efforts aimed at averting an outright occupation of the city. A Fragile Glimmer of Diplomacy Amid the carnage, a slender thread of hope has emerged through diplomatic channels. Peace talks, brokered by Qatar, began early in April with an initial session on the 7th and a follow-up scheduled for the 9th. Yet on the ground, the disconnect remains palpable—as fighting persists unabated and ceasefire promises are repeatedly broken. Uvira: A Symbol of Endless Conflict Once a thriving urban centre, Uvira now stands on the brink. Besieged by relentless M23 attacks, fragmented FARDC counterattacks, internal divisions, and regional power plays, the city has become a stark symbol of eastern Congo’s enduring tragedy. Civilians bear the ultimate cost of this unyielding conflict. With only around 6,000 Wazalendo fighters still defending Uvira, a desperate appeal has been made to President Tshisekedi for additional ammunition and supplies. Recent clashes, which claimed at least 17 Burundian soldiers in Rugezi, underscore the grim reality: Uvira is now squarely in the rebels’ sights, its future uncertain, and its people paying the highest price for an endless war.
The Democratic Republic of Congo is once again walking a dangerous tightrope. Just 50 kilometres east of Kinshasa, a planned search of former president Joseph Kabila’s vast 20,000-hectare estate in Kingakati, scheduled for Thursday, April 17, 2025, risks igniting an already combustible political environment. Kabila, who governed from 2001 to 2019, still looms large over Congolese politics through his political coalition, the Common Front for Congo (FCC). Should this operation go ahead, it could unleash a cascade of political, security, and military repercussions—uncertain in scope, but potentially explosive. A Calculated Move to a Rebel-Held East In a context already rife with tension, Kabila recently announced his intention to return to the DRC—not to Kinshasa, the heart of power—but to the country’s troubled eastern region. Speaking from exile in South Africa, where he has lived since December 2023, Kabila dropped a political bombshell earlier this month: he would return to the east to “help find a solution” to the ongoing crisis there. That region—home to Goma and Bukavu—is largely controlled by rebel groups such as the Congo River Alliance (AFC/M23), which Kinshasa accuses of receiving backing from Rwanda. President Félix Tshisekedi, who has long suspected Kabila of collusion with these groups—an accusation Kabila flatly denies—sees the timing of this return, coinciding with the planned Kingakati raid, as anything but coincidental. After years of relative silence, Kabila appears to be positioning himself as a credible alternative to a faltering regime, tapping into public discontent over its failure to stabilize the east. Echoes of 1997: When Political Rivalries Turn Violent The current moment evokes troubling memories of Congo-Brazzaville in 1997, when a political power struggle between President Pascal Lissouba and former leader Denis Sassou-Nguesso erupted into full-blown civil war. Ethnic militias turned Brazzaville into a war zone, leaving 15,000 dead and toppling the government with foreign help. Today, the DRC seems perilously close to a similar descent into chaos—with Kabila cast in the role of a modern-day Sassou-Nguesso: a powerful former president whom the current leadership struggles to neutralize. The Domino Effect: Politics, Security, and the Military By relocating to a region outside government control, Kabila could breathe new life into the FCC and derail Tshisekedi’s efforts to build a government of national unity—a crucial strategy meant to ease the current crisis. The Kingakati raid, interpreted by many as a political provocation, risks sparking demonstrations in Kinshasa and elsewhere. The situation is volatile: if credible links are found between Kabila’s networks and the eastern rebels, any chance for domestic or international mediation could quickly unravel. From a security perspective, Kabila’s presence in the east may be read as tacit support for AFC/M23, emboldening them to escalate their operations. Should the government respond with military force, the region could descend further into conflict. Other armed factions may also exploit the chaos, expanding their influence as central authority weakens. A Fractured Army on Shaky Ground The military stakes are equally troubling. Kabila still enjoys ties with key officers in the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC). His reappearance in the east could spark defections and erode military cohesion just when unity is most needed. Even more concerning are reports that Kabila met with officials from Rwanda and Uganda before his announcement—raising fears of shadow alliances that could regionalize the crisis and thwart diplomatic solutions. Kingakati: The Spark in a Political Powder Keg If the Kingakati raid is carried out as planned on 17th April, it could serve as the flashpoint for wider unrest. Pro-Kabila loyalists may take to the streets, leading to confrontations with security forces—a scenario reminiscent of the militia-driven violence in Brazzaville nearly three decades ago. With Kabila now in the east, the possibility of coordination between his supporters and the rebels adds a dangerous new dimension to an already combustible mix. What Can Stop the Spiral? MONUSCO and the World Are Watching Unlike the Congo-Brazzaville crisis of 1997, the DRC today benefits from the presence of MONUSCO and heightened international attention—though many Congolese have lost faith in both. Whether these guardrails can actually prevent an escalation will depend heavily on how Kinshasa manages the immediate fallout. Past episodes—like the 2023 raid on General John Numbi’s estate or the 2024 attack on one of Kabila’s residences—show how quickly violence can flare up, but also how swiftly it can be contained when political will exists. Verdict: Tshisekedi’s High-Stakes Gamble Caught between the symbolic weight of the Kingakati raid and Kabila’s provocative return to rebel-held territory, President Tshisekedi is at a crossroads. Politically, this moment threatens to further polarize the nation. From a security standpoint, it risks emboldening armed groups and inflaming violence. Militarily, it may splinter the FARDC and worsen tensions with neighbouring countries. If mismanaged, this volatile combination could plunge the DRC back into a familiar cycle of unrest. Dialogue and diplomacy are now more critical than ever to defuse a crisis whose full consequences may only be beginning to unfold.
In April, the UN Security Council will receive a briefing from Special Envoy Huang Xia on the situation in the Great Lakes region, focusing on the worsening conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and the Peace, Security, and Cooperation Framework (PSC-F). UNICEF Executive Director Catherine Russell will also speak, highlighting child protection concerns.
In April, the Security Council will receive a briefing on the situation in West Africa and the Sahel. Mr. Leonardo Santos Simão, Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), is expected to brief members on political, security, and regional developments.
The UN Security Council will hold a private meeting on Somalia. James Swan, the UN’s top representative in Somalia, will brief the Council, along with an African Union (AU) representative. They’ll review progress on the AU’s new mission, AUSSOM, and the UN’s own mission, UNTMIS. A joint session with the AU, UN, and international partners is also planned.
This month, the Security Council will discuss the situation in South Sudan and review the latest UN report. Nicholas Haysom, head of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), will provide updates on the country’s political and security situation. The Council will also decide whether to renew UNMISS’s mandate before it expires on 30 April.
The UN Security Council met behind closed doors to discuss the worsening crisis in Sudan, marking two years since the conflict began between the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The meeting was requested by Denmark, Slovenia, and the UK.
In April, the UN Security Council will hold its regular briefing on Libya. Hanna Tetteh, the UN’s new Special Representative and head of the Libya mission (UNSMIL), will update members on political, security, and humanitarian issues, as well as the latest Secretary-General report. A separate briefing by the Chair of the Libya Sanctions Committee may also occur, though the chair has not yet been appointed.
In April, the Security Council will hold closed consultations on the UN mission in Western Sahara (MINURSO). Alexander Ivanko (Head of MINURSO) and Staffan de Mistura (UN Envoy) will brief the Council.
Since 2012, the Sahel has been plunged into a cycle of jihadist violence that has caused tens of thousands of deaths and displaced millions. This violence, initially concentrated in northern Mali, has gradually spread to Burkina Faso and Niger, before directly threatening the coastal countries of West Africa, such as Benin, Togo, and Côte d’Ivoire.
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has officially transferred the West African Police Information System (WAPIS) to national and regional authorities, marking a pivotal advancement in the region's security infrastructure.
AUC, in collaboration with the UNDRR, the CIMA Research Foundation, and the IGAD, convened the third coordination and co-production meeting for the AMHEWAS in Kampala, Uganda, from 10 to 13 April 2025. This gathering coincided with the 22nd session of the Africa Working Group on Disaster Risk Reduction, scheduled for 15–17 April 2025.
The security situation in the Sahel region—covering Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and extending toward northern Benin—continues to deteriorate, marked by the growing military capabilities of terrorist armed groups.
Burkina Faso has faced a series of devastating attacks by terrorist groups, particularly the Katiba Macina and Katiba Hanifa factions of JNIM, leaving a trail of destruction and loss.
Senegal’s political and security landscape has undergone significant shifts following the presidential election on March 24, 2024. Bassirou Diomaye Faye, an opposition candidate from the PASTEF party, emerged victorious in the first round, marking a peaceful transition of power. This reinforced Senegal’s reputation as one of West Africa’s most stable democracies, despite earlier turbulence.
The Islamist militant group Ahlu Sunnah Waljama'a (ASWJ) continues to pose a significant threat in the northern provinces, particularly Cabo Delgado.
Amid these tensions, diplomatic initiatives have intensified, led by Qatar’s mediation efforts.
Al-Shabaab is making swift territorial gains in the Middle and Lower Shabelle regions, pushing back SNA forces and increasing the threat to Mogadishu. Government troops are struggling with heavy losses, and clan militias that once supported them are now withdrawing.
In the turbulent east of the DRC, Walikale, a town nestled in the North Kivu province, stands on the verge of collapse. The M23/AFC rebels, having breached the defensive lines of the FARDC, are on the cusp of seizing this strategic stronghold. Gunfire erupted in the afternoon of 19 March in and around Walikale-centre, according to multiple local sources who reported the presence of M23/AFC rebels at the city's gates.
In February, JNIM carried out sustained attacks across Burkina Faso, targeting security forces and civilians. Key incidents included assaults in Djibo (Sahel region), Tanwalbougou (East region), and Bango (North region), with significant casualties among soldiers and Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP) members. The group also escalated attacks on civilians, killing healthcare workers and displacing communities in Boucle du Mouhoun.
The M23 rebel group has temporarily halted its southward advance along the Burundian border in eastern DRC, following what appears to be a deconfliction agreement between Rwanda and Burundi. This development has reduced the immediate risk of regional escalation, even as M23 continues its operations elsewhere. Civilian and military intelligence agencies from both nations have convened twice recently, with the latest meeting held on March 10, 2025, in Kirundo Province near Rwanda's eastern border.
The conflict in Tigray, Ethiopia, has led to a severe humanitarian crisis marked by genocide, famine, and mass displacement. Despite the signing of a Cessation of Hostilities Agreement (CoHA) in November 2022, the situation remains unstable, with ongoing human rights abuses, restricted humanitarian aid, and the continued occupation of Tigrayan territories.
The United States has ordered the evacuation of diplomatic personnel from Juba, the capital of South Sudan, while Uganda has deployed special forces to the city. These actions mirror the response to the outbreak of South Sudan’s last civil war in 2013, signalling a credible risk of renewed violence.
Initially deployed alongside the FARDC and the Ugandan army to combat the ADF, many Wazalendo militiamen have abandoned their security duties. Instead, they have turned their attention to illegal mining operations in Mambasa territory, Ituri province.
Somalia’s security situation in early 2025 remains complex and volatile, characterized by ongoing conflict between the Federal Government of Somalia (FGS), its allied forces, and the Al-Shabaab militant group, alongside emerging regional tensions and a transitioning international security presence.
Russia is strengthening its military presence in eastern Libya, particularly in areas controlled by Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Unlike in other African regions, Haftar is paid by the Russians to use these facilities, which serve as gateways to Chad and Sudan—two crucial areas for Russia amid the ongoing Sudanese civil war.
Didier Mazenga, the Minister of Regional Integration and Francophonie for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and special envoy of President Félix Tshisekedi, visited Chad on Tuesday, February 18th.
The Russian naval base in Sudan appears to be moving forward. On February 12, Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Youssif announced during his visit to Moscow that the long-discussed project was back on track.
With Cameroon’s presidential election set for October 2025, foreign embassies in Yaoundé are actively positioning themselves for potential political changes.
On Friday, February 14, 2025, the M23 outmanoeuvred the FARDC/Wazalendo and the Burundian army, entering Katana at dawn, near Kavumu and Bukavu airport. Following the "liberation" of the city, they held a press conference.
The sudden departure of President Félix Tshisekedi from Kinshasa has ignited widespread speculation in the Congolese capital. Did he leave or not? That question looms over the city.
On Tuesday, February 11, 2025, the Congolese government escalated tensions between the DRC and Rwanda by banning all Rwandan-registered or Rwandan-based aircraft from flying over its territory. This decision comes amid deteriorating diplomatic relations and ongoing armed conflict between the two nations.
On Friday, February 7, 2025, a devastating ambush struck Mali as jihadists attacked a civilian convoy escorted by the Malian army and Wagner forces. The assault occurred between the cities of Gao and Ansongo, a region long plagued by violence and instability. The attack resulted in over fifty fatalities, including both civilians and military personnel, and left many others injured. The wounded were transported to Gao for urgent medical care.
The joint summit of the EAC and the SADC, held in Dar es Salaam on February 8, reaffirmed its call for the withdrawal of uninvited foreign armed forces from the DRC. The summit stressed the importance of respecting the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.
According to analyses by the INDEPENDENT GROUP of CONGOLESE EXPERTS IN POLITICS CONTEXT AND GEO-STRATEGY (GIE), fighting persists along the Nyabibwe–Lushebere–Nyamukubi axis, which is now under M23 control. This has triggered widespread panic in surrounding areas, including Rambira, Muhongoza, Ihusi, Kabamba, and Katana. Meanwhile, the Congolese Armed Forces (FARDC) are retreating in disorder toward Kabamba, Katana-Center, Kavumu, and Bukavu, leading to looting and extortion due to a lack of command control.
Since the liberation of Wad-Madani in central Sudan, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have collapsed and are on the brink of losing the capital. A year ago, the RSF, a paramilitary militia from Darfur, took control of Wad Madani and the fertile Jezira region, encircling Sennar and reaching the Ethiopian border in June.
Following the urgent security measures implemented by MONUSCO, including the relocation of non-essential personnel from Goma to Entebbe in Uganda and Kinshasa, as well as the demonstrations recorded in Kinshasa last week after the capture of the strategic city of Goma by the M23 armed group, several embassies have advised their nationals to exercise caution
Facing the advance of the M23 towards Uganda’s zone of influence in eastern DRC, Kampala oscillates between fear and rapprochement with the M23. The resurgence of the March 23 Movement occurred following a violation of Rwanda’s zone of influence in eastern DRC.
The advance of the M23 in South Kivu is exacerbating an already critical situation. In response, Albert Foka Mike, the provincial Minister of the Interior for South Kivu, has called on former soldiers, combatants, and volunteers to join the FARDC to combat the M23.
The Daesh Khawarij Group is a militant organization operating primarily in Puntland, Somalia. Led by Abdiqadir Muumin, the group has a structured leadership, a growing membership, and ambitious plans for expansion. Here’s a closer look at their operations, organizational structure, and future strategies.
Somalia continues to face profound challenges in security, governance, and socioeconomic development. Despite ongoing efforts by Somali authorities and international partners, the country remains plagued by instability, weak government institutions, and the enduring threat of terrorism, particularly from Al-Shabaab. The suspension of international donor support, including decisions made during the Trump administration, has exacerbated the risks faced by the Somali population.
The Islamic State (IS) has increasingly extended its influence into East Africa, with Tanzania experiencing notable security challenges linked to this expansion. Tanzania's geographical proximity to conflict zones in Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has heightened its vulnerability to extremist activities.
The situation in North Kivu continues to deteriorate. Clashes between the M23 rebels and the FARDC escalated along the Goma-Sake axis.
Burkina Faso continues to face severe security challenges characterized by extremist violence, improvised explosive device (IED) attacks, and assaults on security forces and Volontaires pour la Défense de la Patrie (VDPs). Ongoing clashes between Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISSP) have further destabilized the nation, displacing vulnerable populations.
Guinea’s transition timeline ended on December 31 without clear plans for the next steps or a schedule for elections. Opposition groups and civil society organizations announced they no longer recognize the transitional government. Protests in early January turned violent, with clashes between demonstrators and security forces, signaling increasing instability. If restrictions on political parties persist or worsen, protests are expected to grow, potentially uniting multiple grievances.
• OPERATIONAL SITUATION • SECURITY SITUATION • BORDER SITUATION • SOCIO-HUMANITARIAN SITUATION
The Sahel region is experiencing one of the most severe and rapidly growing humanitarian crises globally. Armed conflicts, climate change, and political instability have combined to displace millions, disrupt essential services, and exacerbate food insecurity.
The crisis in Mali has recently taken a new turn with the reorganization of armed groups in the North. Under the leadership of Bilal Ag Acherif, a key figure in the Tuareg rebellions, the Front for the Liberation of Azawad (FLA) has emerged from the merger of movements previously united under the Strategic Framework for the Defense of the People of Azawad (CSP-DPA). This regrouping signifies a desire to consolidate forces to defend the interests of the northern populations amidst the escalating conflict with the Malian state and its allies, notably the African Corps (former Wagner Group).
