Arming of Terrorist Armed Groups in the Sahel and Central Africa: Evolution of a Multidimensional Regional Threat

The security situation in the Sahel region—covering Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and extending toward northern Benin—continues to deteriorate, marked by the growing military capabilities of terrorist armed groups. This dynamic was illustrated by the attack on Diapaga (Burkina Faso) on March 28, 2025, carried out by fighters affiliated with Jama'a Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). Its leader, Jafar Dicko, acknowledged tactical successes, while also admitting that his forces remain under-equipped in terms of logistics and weaponry to achieve their strategic goals. He announced plans to intensify operations, particularly targeting national Defense and Security Forces (FDS) and Volunteers for the Defense of the Homeland (VDP).

The Sahel

Disparities in Weaponry and Predation as the Primary Supply Method

Security operations such as "Green Whirlwind" in Burkina Faso’s Sourou Valley have led to the seizure of various weapons:

• AK-47 assault rifles and Chinese variants (Type 56)
• DShK heavy machine guns
• RPG-7 rocket launchers
• Mortars
• 12-gauge hunting rifles

These weapons originate primarily from predation—acquired during attacks on security forces and community-based defense groups (e.g., the Dozo hunters in Mali). Despite the groups’ affiliation with umbrella organizations like JNIM or the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), logistical coordination between different “Katibas” remains limited, reflecting a high degree of operational and geographic autonomy.

Central Africa

Growing Military Capabilities of ISCAP in the DRC and Mozambique

In Central Africa, affiliates of the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP)—notably the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)—have expanded their military capacities in eastern DRC (particularly North Kivu and Ituri) and northern Mozambique (Cabo Delgado Province).

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (ADF/ISCAP):

Weapons frequently used include:

• AK-47 and Type 56 rifles
• PKM and PKT machine guns
• RPG-7s
• 60mm and 81mm mortars
• Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and handmade grenades
• Bladed weapons (machetes, axes) used in village raids

These arms are primarily obtained through raids on FARDC positions, cross-border trafficking (notably from Uganda and South Sudan), and criminal smuggling networks. In Ituri, operational links have emerged between certain CODECO factions and ADF/ISCAP militants, particularly in the economic domain: essential goods purchased in Beni, Butembo, and Oicha are resold in Ituri via commercial circuits managed by CODECO-affiliated networks. CODECO has been repeatedly cited as having ties to elements within the Congolese army (FARDC), indirectly contributing to ISCAP's logistical support.

In Mozambique (Cabo Delgado):

Arms used include:

• AK-47 variants
• PKM, DShK, and RPD light machine guns
• RPG-7s
• Improvised explosives
• Basic reconnaissance drones
• Seized weapons from Mozambican defense forces or smuggled through Tanzania

Temporary control over certain towns has allowed these groups to access significant stocks of weapons and ammunition, boosting their resilience against joint operations conducted by Mozambican, Rwandan, and SADC forces.

Risks Related to Weapons Proliferation and Strategic Observations

The expansion of paramilitary forces—over 50,000 VDP in Burkina Faso, and an estimated 60,000+ self-defense fighters in the DRC—has militarized vast regions. While this has enhanced national security capabilities, it has also increased the risk of arms being captured by terrorist groups. Recovered weapons are often identical to those used by official forces, illustrating a pattern of indirect reinforcement through predation.

Three Key Strategic Observations:

Predation remains the principal source of arms acquisition across both regions.

Limited inter-group weapons transfers suggest fragmented logistics and a lack of operational coordination.

Despite the accumulation of weapons, terrorist groups still report insufficient logistical capacity to meet their strategic ambitions.

It is essential to prevent these groups from reaching a critical mass of weaponry, which could trigger an escalation in the scale and frequency of attacks. The risk of expansion toward coastal West African states, particularly the Gulf of Guinea (Togo, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire), is increasingly tangible.

The 2025 Global Terrorism Index places Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger among the world’s five most affected countries by terrorism.