ASA Situation Update: Tanzania’s 2025 General Election & Overthrow Risk

African Security Analysis (ASA) 30th October 2025

Latest Development

Tanzania’s 29 October general elections have pushed the country into its most volatile moment of the multiparty era. Provisional tallies carried by state media place President Samia Suluhu Hassan and the ruling CCM on course for a decisive victory, even as major opposition figures were excluded from the ballot and protests have entered a second day. Security forces have imposed a dusk curfew in Dar es Salaam, used live fire and tear gas to disperse crowds, and deployed around key intersections and tally centres. A nationwide internet disruption has hampered communications and independent verification. Rights groups report at least two fatalities and multiple injuries linked to crowd control.

Political and Security Picture

The vote—covering presidential, parliamentary, and local races—unfolded on an uneven playing field. Opposition leaders, including CHADEMA’s Tundu Lissu, were barred or detained in the run-up, fuelling boycott calls and a narrative of a “coronation.” In Zanzibar, the contest appears tighter but with CCM still advantaged. African Union and East African Community observer missions deployed late in the cycle and flagged process sensitivities; preliminary statements are pending.

Unrest, which began in Dar es Salaam on election day, spread on 29–30 October to other urban centres. Local authorities instructed some civil servants and students to stay home, and access roads to Julius Nyerere International Airport were intermittently disrupted. Ferry links and other transport nodes saw heightened security postures. Calls for investigations into the use of force have intensified, with at least two deaths confirmed and additional casualty claims circulating amid the information blackout.

Information Environment

Independent network measurements indicate a nationwide disruption to internet and social platforms from the morning of election day into 30 October. Restrictions have limited the ability of protesters to coordinate and of media to verify claims, while state outlets have emphasized strong CCM returns and downplayed unrest. Despite the blackout, user-generated clips shared via VPNs continue to show fires, clashes, and youth-led chants such as “No Reforms, No Election.”

Overthrow Risk Assessment (as of 30 Oct 2025)

Bottom line: A full government overthrow—by coup, mass revolution, or sustained insurrection—remains unlikely in the short term (next 3–6 months), but the risk is elevated compared to pre-election levels. Sustained youth-led mobilization, reputational damage to electoral legitimacy, and visible coercive tactics create a combustible environment; however, CCM’s entrenched control of security institutions, electoral administration, and broadcast media provides substantial buffers. Recent analytical framing describes Tanzania as “competitive authoritarian,” with instability risks rising if grievances are not addressed.

Key drivers increasing risk include the exclusion of major opposition figures, arrests, and the nationwide internet shutdown, all of which have catalysed unusually broad, youth-heavy protests. Demonstrations have spread beyond the commercial capital, with isolated arson and clashes reported; security responses have intensified, and fatalities have been documented. Momentum could accelerate if results are certified rapidly without dialogue or visible concessions. Socio-economic pressures—youth unemployment and perceptions of corruption—heighten volatility. Online sentiment where connectivity allows is sharply polarized, and protest messaging has coalesced around legitimacy and reform rather than narrow party branding, suggesting staying power if repression backfires. Institutional legitimacy has eroded, as rights-group reporting and critical commentary from international outlets circulate despite restrictions; observation missions offer a channel for pressure but have limited leverage absent domestic dialogue.

Mitigating factors are significant. CCM’s six-decade dominance rests on cohesive control of the security services, electoral machinery, and state media. There are no credible indications of military defections or elite splits. Curfews, targeted arrests, and perimeter security at strategic nodes have constrained protester advances. Procedural pathways to certify results and complete the transition remain intact unless disrupted by elite fractures or extraordinary crowd sizes.

Scenario outlook:

• 1–3 months: Low likelihood of overthrow. The most probable path is a contained protest cycle under curfew, intermittent surges around symbolic sites (tally centre’s, airport approaches), and rapid certification of results. Human-rights risks remain elevated; targeted arrests and information controls persist.
• 3–12 months: Medium likelihood of renewed unrest, particularly if there is no credible opening for reforms—most notably around electoral management and civil liberties. Watch for signs of intra-party strain within CCM, student-led organizing, and any AU/EAC-facilitated dialogue.
• 12+ months: Elevated structural risk if today’s legitimacy crisis calcifies into a durable grievance narrative and if repression alienates key urban constituencies. A coup scenario remains improbable without elite fissures; a recurring protest-repression cycle is more plausible and would entrench instability.

Operational Implications (next 72 hours)

Avoid protest-prone corridors in central Dar es Salaam and around tally sites. Schedule essential movements during daylight, pre-clear routes, and maintain a low profile. Confirm airport and ferry status before travel. Assume degraded mobile data; pre-position offline maps and rely on staggered check-ins via SMS or radio. Reassess site operations daily in line with curfew scope and visible security posture.

Analyst Confidence: Moderate. Core judgments are supported by converging wire reports, rights-group statements, and network measurements of connectivity, but precise turnout, constituency-level results, and comprehensive casualty figures remain uncertain under current restrictions.