Cabo Delgado Crisis

Security, Displacement, and Regional Response

Since early May 2025, northern Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado province has witnessed a sharp escalation in insurgent violence, triggering widespread displacement and endangering key economic projects. Despite joint operations involving Mozambican and Rwandan forces, Islamist militants continue to exploit security gaps, prompting urgent humanitarian and strategic responses both on the ground and at the regional level.

Intensified Militant Attacks

Islamic State-affiliated fighters have launched coordinated raids on multiple fronts:

• Village Assaults: In the districts of Macomia and Chiure, dawn raids have left homes looted, civilians killed or kidnapped, and attackers retreating into dense forest strongholds.
• Road Ambushes: Supply convoys traveling along the N380 highway have been ambushed, with passengers taken for ransom and cargoes seized. Such incidents continue to jeopardize both commercial operations and humanitarian logistics.
• Outpost Overruns: Remote positions in Quissanga and Montepuez have fallen to insurgents, who have captured weapons and destroyed defensive installations. These actions underline the militants’ uncanny ability to strike in both rural and semi-urban settings.

Surge in Displacement

The recent wave of attacks has compounded an already severe displacement crisis in northern Mozambique:

• IDP Figures: Over 945,000 people are now internally displaced in northern Mozambique, with Cabo Delgado alone hosting more than 820,000 individuals—a 30,000 increase since March.
• Living Conditions: Many displaced families rely on emergency food rations amid acute shortages. Makeshift camps around Pemba, Metuge, and Muidumbe suffer from substandard water, sanitation, and shelter facilities.
• Vulnerability: Women and children account for approximately 80% of the displaced population, facing heightened risks of exploitation, gender-based violence, and recruitment by armed militants.

Regional Security Efforts

In response to the escalating insurgency, regional forces have mobilized:

• Rwandan Reinforcements: In April, Kigali deployed an additional 500 troops to secure vital road arteries and urban peripheries around Pemba.
• Mozambican Joint Patrols: Mozambican armed forces continue coordinated operations with Rwandan counterparts. However, resource constraints and difficult terrain pose significant challenges for operations in remote bush areas.
• SADC Drawdown: The SAMIM mission, under the aegis of the Southern African Development Community, has begun a phased withdrawal ahead of its July 2025 mandate expiry, raising concerns about a potential security vacuum once international troops depart.

Humanitarian Impact

The crisis has had a severe toll on the civilian population:

• Food Insecurity: Blocked access to fields and markets has left many households without essential supplies, increasing reliance on World Food Programme distributions.
• Health Risks: Overcrowded camps with insufficient water and sanitation render displaced populations especially vulnerable to cholera and other waterborne diseases—a risk that intensifies with the approaching rainy season.
• Healthcare Access: Repeated attacks on medical facilities have diminished regional healthcare capacity, prompting NGOs to deploy mobile health teams under armed escort.

Economic and Infrastructure Consequences

Key development projects in Cabo Delgado face significant delays:

• LNG Ventures: Major liquefied natural gas projects remain under force majeure as security challenges stall restart plans and shake investor confidence.
• Mining and Agriculture: Ongoing exploration and rehabilitation efforts have been paused, adversely affecting local employment and critical revenue streams for provincial economies.

Evolution of IS-Mozambique and Its Operational Network

Since its emergence as the local affiliate of the Islamic State in 2017, IS-Mozambique has steadily expanded its foothold across Cabo Delgado. Initially focusing on rural villages, the group now has the operational capacity to conduct complex amphibious raids along the coast, ambush convoys on inland routes, and deploy improvised explosive devices against regional security forces. Their organizational structure blends decentralized cells with a core command that can orchestrate multi-district operations under a unified strategic vision.

Recent Engagement with Rwandan Forces: On 3 May 2025, IS-Mozambique fighters ambushed a Rwandan platoon conducting joint patrols near the Chiure–Metuge axis. The assault employed a feint to lure reinforcements into a trap with heavy machine guns, inflicting five casualties on Rwandan troops. Although rapid medevac operations by Rwandan helicopters mitigated further loss of life, the incident has exposed persistent gaps in local force protection and underscored the militants’ growing confidence in directly challenging professional foreign contingents.

Financial and Logistical Networks

IS-Mozambique’s funding is derived from a mix of illicit activities and external patronage. Key income streams include:

• Customs Racketeering: Revenues generated from unofficial checkpoints along smuggling routes, levying fees on fuel, food, and consumer goods.
• Kidnapping for Ransom: High-profile abductions fetch five- to six-figure sums, circulated through informal hawala networks.
• Smuggling of Precious Woods and Gemstones: Illicit extraction from poorly regulated artisanal mines in border regions.
• External Transfers: Intelligence reports indicate intermittent funding and weapon shipments routed through coastal informants tied to East African arms brokers.

These financial and logistical networks enable the group to sustain recruitment, procure small arms, and maintain tactical mobility. Faced with disruptions to formal financial channels, IS-Mozambique has even expanded quasi-banking services among sympathetic local communities, deepening its economic foothold.

Link with the Democratic Republic of the Congo

IS-Mozambique and its counterpart in eastern DR Congo—often referred to as ISIS-DRC—function as two branches of a single transnational network within Central Africa. Sharing leaders, fighters, finances, and tactics, both groups benefit from mutual support and shared safe havens. Sources close to ADF-ISCAP and contacted by Africa Security Analyst in Kampala confirm that Musa Baluku is still facilitating the movement of troops from the DRC to Mozambique via Burundi and Tanzania. The insecure situation in eastern DRC thus provides an easy transit route for combatants moving between the two countries.

Common Roots and Leadership

Both groups originated under the IS-Central Africa Province before formally splitting into Mozambican and Congolese provinces in mid-2022. Key commanders have moved between fronts, and experienced veterans from the ADF insurgency in eastern Congo have previously overseen operations on both sides of the border.

Cross-Border Fighters and Training: Field reports confirm that militants from Mozambique and the DRC are trained together in the dense forests along their shared frontier. They exchange expertise in bomb-making, ambush techniques, and battlefield intelligence, effectively blurring the lines between the two affiliates.

Shared Propaganda and Recruitment

The groups disseminate unified messages in both Portuguese and Swahili, framing their struggle as part of a regional caliphate. Propaganda videos and newsletters often feature footage from both provinces, reinforcing a common sense of purpose.

Integrated Funding and Logistics

Ransom payments from kidnappings in Cabo Delgado flow through informal hawala channels linking to eastern Congo, while illicit timber and charcoal trade routes serve as conduits for weapons, cash, and fighters. Informal border checkpoints collect tributes that are pooled to sustain operations on both sides.

Coordinated Attacks and Tactics

In late 2024 and early 2025, nearly simultaneous raids on villages and ambushes on security patrols in Mozambique and the DRC were carried out using identical tactics—combining IEDs with mounted heavy machine guns. Even assaults on regional forces, such as the May 3 ambush of Rwandan troops in Mozambique and ADF strikes on FARDC positions, demonstrate a consistent operational signature.

Implications

Because IS-Mozambique and ISIS-DRC operate as a cohesive transnational network, degrading one part of the network without addressing the other simply displaces fighters and resources. Effective counter-terrorism efforts must therefore be synchronized, with cooperative operations, comprehensive information-sharing, and coordinated financial interdiction across borders to close the safe havens that enable the network to regenerate.

Conclusion

The Cabo Delgado crisis remains one of the region’s most pressing security dilemmas as violent insurgent activities continue to escalate. The mounting loss of life, dramatic displacement, and disruption to economic development underscore a rapidly deteriorating situation. With Islamist militants expanding their operational reach through sophisticated tactics, and with their networks intricately linked with insurgencies in neighboring DR Congo, the challenge is multinational in scope.

Failure to do so risks not only further destabilizing northern Mozambique but also triggering a broader regional security crisis.

Africa Security Analysis continues to monitor the situation closely and will provide regular updates as the crisis evolves. The coming days are critical for determining whether coordinated regional efforts can stem the tide of violence and mitigate its long-term impact on civilian lives and key economic projects in Cabo Delgado and beyond.