Deteriorating Security in Burundi Amid Refugee Influx from Eastern DRC

African Security Analysis (ASA) – Special Report (December 2025)

Overview

Burundi is facing a rapidly worsening humanitarian and security situation following a major refugee influx from eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in December 2025. More than 100,000 Congolese civilians have entered Burundi this month, fleeing intense fighting in South Kivu. This is the second major influx in 2025, arriving while Burundi was still recovering from earlier displacement pressures.

Border reception points and improvised shelters are severely overcrowded. Cholera has spread, basic services are stretched close to collapse, and conditions are deteriorating in both border areas and inland relocation sites. The crisis has also created security risks: local tensions are rising, national forces are overstretched, and the conflict next door threatens to spill across borders. This report summarizes the situation in a clear, reader-friendly format and highlights key risks, early warning indicators, and priority actions.

Timeline and Routes of Refugee Flows

The emergency began in early December 2025, when fighting sharply escalated in South Kivu, especially around Kamanyola, Luvungi, and Katogota in the Ruzizi Plain. Civilians fled as clashes intensified between the Congolese army (FARDC), allied militias, and the M23.

The most significant turning point came on the night of December 9–10, when Uvira fell to M23 after heavy combat and shelling. This triggered a mass flight of civilians from Uvira and surrounding areas, with refugees reporting chaos, street gunfire, artillery impacts, and fear of atrocities.

Refugees entered Burundi through several channels. In the northwest, many crossed into Cibitoke Province via the Buganda area, overwhelming local capacity. In the west, Gatumba, near Bujumbura, became a major entry point for those fleeing the Uvira axis. At the same time, large numbers crossed Lake Tanganyika in overloaded boats, landing around Rumonge; at least one vessel reportedly capsized, causing fatalities.

The pace was extraordinary. Roughly 40,000 people arrived between December 5 and 11, and by around December 19 the number had risen to over 84,000 in two weeks. By late December, cumulative arrivals surpassed 100,000. Gatumba hosted around 25,000, the Buganda/Rugombo zone nearly 40,000, and Rumonge over 20,000, with additional arrivals through informal crossing points.

This influx followed an earlier wave in January–March 2025, when fighting in North and South Kivu drove an estimated 70,000 Congolese into Burundi. December’s arrivals therefore struck a system that was already strained, compounding vulnerabilities and increasing the risk of longer-term instability.

Humanitarian and Logistical Pressure on Burundi

Burundi’s response capacity has been exceeded by the speed and size of the influx. Border reception locations turned into mass encampments almost overnight. In Rugombo, a stadium was converted into a temporary shelter. In Gatumba, refugees clustered in open areas with minimal shade and limited supplies. In Rumonge, families camped along the lakeshore and in public spaces, creating immediate sanitation and protection challenges.

Registration and documentation efforts began through ONPRA with UNHCR support, but the sheer volume meant that many arrivals went unregistered for days. Emergency assistance—water, high-energy food, plastic sheeting—was rushed to the main entry points, yet demand quickly outpaced supply.

A central challenge has been relocating people away from crowded border zones. Authorities moved large numbers inland to a new site at Busuma hill (Ruyigi Province), beginning around December 9. This required daily transport convoys across long distances, stretching fuel, coordination, and security capacity. By late December, Busuma hosted over 50,000 people, far beyond its initial planning assumptions. Some refugees were also relocated to expanded existing camps such as Bwagiriza and Nyankanda.

Food insecurity is rising fast. Many refugees arrived with nothing, and while communal kitchens were established, rations have been tight and distribution queues long. Agencies were already operating under funding and stock constraints from earlier crises, and the sudden increase in need has pushed supplies toward dangerous shortages.

Water and sanitation pressures are even more immediate. Several sites initially had too few water points and almost no latrines, driving reliance on unsafe sources and increasing contamination. Humanitarian teams have begun installing water bladders and digging latrines, but coverage remains insufficient. Women and children continue to travel long distances for water, and overcrowding undermines hygiene measures.

Host communities are also under strain. Border towns and rural areas already have limited services, and clinics have run short of basic medicines. In Ruyigi, camp demand has reportedly drained local water supply systems, leaving surrounding villages anxious and resentful. The perception that assistance is focused only on refugees—while locals remain vulnerable—creates a real risk of tension, especially as prices rise and services deteriorate.

Financially, Burundi has acknowledged it cannot manage the crisis alone. An emergency appeal of roughly $35 million was launched to cover immediate needs, but funding has been slow, delaying expansions of shelter, health capacity, and water systems.

Health Crisis and Breakdown of Services

The influx has quickly become a public health emergency. Overcrowding, unsafe water, limited sanitation, and constant movement between sites have created ideal conditions for disease spread. Cholera outbreaks have already been confirmed in multiple locations. Rumonge has been heavily affected, with several confirmed cases and at least seven reported deaths among refugees. Busuma also recorded a growing cluster, reaching at least 34 cases and one reported death by around December 19.

Treatment centres have been established, and response teams have begun water chlorination and emergency hygiene measures. However, the outbreak is difficult to contain because people move between sites, health services are stretched, and supplies are limited. Efforts to deploy oral cholera vaccines are underway, but vaccine availability and logistics are constraints.

Beyond cholera, the medical burden is severe. Many refugees arrived with untreated injuries and illnesses worsened by exhaustion and exposure. Maternal health risks are elevated as births occur in transit or in crowded sites without sufficient skilled support. The risk of measles is high due to the large proportion of children and likely vaccination gaps, and initial immunization activities have begun but need rapid scaling. Malaria is another major threat, intensified by lack of mosquito nets and inadequate clinic capacity.

Mental health needs are widespread. Refugees have experienced extreme violence and displacement, and many show signs of trauma, especially children. Psychosocial support exists but is far below what is required.

The crisis is also disrupting education and social services. Some local schools have been used as temporary shelters or distribution points, interrupting learning for Burundian students. Refugee children are also missing schooling, increasing risks such as exploitation, early marriage, or negative coping behaviours among adolescents if the situation becomes protracted.

Security Implications Inside Burundi and Along the Borders

The scale and speed of the influx creates clear security risks. Inside Burundi, the primary pressure point is community tension driven by resource competition and public health fears. Early signs include local protests and complaints, particularly linked to cholera concerns and the transport of refugees. While solidarity has been strong overall, worsening conditions could trigger scapegoating, small-scale clashes, or localized unrest.

A second concern is the risk of armed infiltration. Eastern DRC’s conflict involves multiple armed actors, and chaotic displacement can provide cover for combatants to cross borders. Burundian security services have reportedly increased screening and patrols, and there have been reports of detentions involving individuals found with weapons or military attire. Even isolated cases are destabilizing: armed elements in camps can intimidate civilians, recruit, or attract attack from rivals.

Burundi’s security forces are also under strain. They must manage crowd control, protect refugees, escort relocations, and reinforce border security at the same time. Any heavy-handed approach risks undermining refugee protection and could inflame tensions; too little control risks criminality, camp disorder, or militarization. Maintaining calm requires disciplined policing, credible community engagement, and clear coordination with humanitarian camp management.

The border environment is also increasingly fragile. With M23 advances placing armed actors near Burundi’s frontier, the risk of cross-border incidents is higher. Burundi has reportedly heightened alert levels along the border and increased monitoring, particularly given concerns that armed groups might pursue rivals or attempt provocations.

Finally, the refugee presence could become politically sensitive. Any serious incident—crime, riot, or cross-border clash—could shift public attitudes quickly and trigger policy responses that may worsen humanitarian conditions if not carefully managed.

Regional Implications for the Great Lakes Region

This crisis reflects the deep interdependence of the Great Lakes. Instability in eastern DRC continues to generate cross-border shocks—refugees, disrupted trade, and heightened interstate mistrust. Burundi’s emergency is directly tied to wider conflict dynamics, including regional allegations and counter-allegations regarding support to armed groups.

Rwanda remains central to the political context, given long-standing accusations around M23 and the equally persistent Rwandan focus on hostile armed groups in the region. In this environment, displacement flows can become securitized, raising the risk of diplomatic escalation if neighbours believe armed elements are moving under civilian cover.

Tanzania is not directly adjacent to South Kivu, but its role matters for refugee burden-sharing and regional diplomacy. If Burundi’s capacity collapses, secondary onward movement becomes more likely, increasing pressure on neighbouring states and regional institutions to coordinate responses.

Regional frameworks such as the EAC and ICGLR offer tools for dialogue, verification of border incidents, and early warning, but the crisis exposes the limits of current approaches. The humanitarian situation in Burundi will remain highly sensitive as long as the conflict in South Kivu continues without a durable political settlement.

Strategic Outlook: Destabilization Risks and Early Warning Indicators

From an African security analysis perspective, Burundi is at real risk of destabilization if humanitarian conditions continue to deteriorate. The most important warning signs to monitor are: rising anti-refugee sentiment and protests in host communities; expanding cholera or measles outbreaks; worsening food shortages and malnutrition; increases in crime, trafficking, or gender-based violence around camps; evidence of armed recruitment or intimidation inside refugee sites; and border incidents linked to militant movements.

If the crisis becomes protracted into 2026, long-term encampment could create additional security risks, particularly among youth facing idleness, trauma, and lack of education. Without early planning for stability and basic livelihoods, a humanitarian crisis can harden into a chronic insecurity challenge.

Regionally, continued rebel advances and failure of ceasefire efforts are clear indicators that further displacement waves may occur. Escalating diplomatic hostility, military build-ups, or increased proxy activity would signal rising risk of a broader regional confrontation.

Conclusion and Priority Actions

Burundi’s December 2025 refugee influx is no longer only a humanitarian challenge—it is a combined humanitarian, public health, and security stress test for the country and the wider Great Lakes region. The arrival of over 100,000 refugees within weeks, on top of earlier displacement in 2025, has pushed border reception sites and inland camps beyond safe capacity. Overcrowding, poor sanitation, and overstretched clinics have already contributed to cholera outbreaks, while the risks of measles and malaria are rising.

The security environment is also becoming more fragile. Burundian forces and local authorities are managing border vigilance, camp order, relocations, and public anxiety at the same time. If conditions continue to deteriorate, the likelihood increases that community tensions, misinformation, crime, exploitation, and fears of armed infiltration could trigger localized instability. Regionally, the crisis reflects continued conflict dynamics in eastern DRC; without progress on de-escalation and political dialogue, further displacement waves remain likely.

The response must therefore be fast, practical, and balanced: saving lives while preventing camp militarization, protecting host community stability, and reducing the chance of cross-border spillover.

Priority Recommendations

1) Stabilize humanitarian conditions as the first security intervention
Burundi and partners should treat water, sanitation, food, and health services as the foundation of stability. Priority actions include rapidly expanding safe water access and sanitation infrastructure—especially in Busuma and transit/lakeshore sites—while strengthening cholera control through functioning treatment centres, reliable ORS and chlorine supplies, hygiene measures, and scaled oral cholera vaccination where feasible. Food pipelines must be reinforced to prevent ration collapse, with targeted nutrition support for children and pregnant or lactating women. Healthcare capacity should expand through temporary clinics, mobile teams, and resupplied essential medicines, including maternal health services.

2) Decongest border locations and bring Busuma and other sites to minimum standards
Relocation inland was necessary, but the new sites are now dangerously crowded. Camp management must shift from emergency placement to safe and organized accommodation. This requires expanding shelter capacity, improving spacing and drainage, increasing lighting and safe communal areas, and strengthening registration and case management so vulnerable groups are identified early. Transport operations should also include health safeguards—basic screening and disinfection protocols—to reduce disease transmission between sites.

3) Support host communities to prevent resentment and preserve social cohesion
Host community fatigue is a major early warning indicator. Assistance should be visibly “two-track,” benefiting both refugees and the communities absorbing the shock. This includes extending water support, vaccination, and primary healthcare outreach to surrounding villages, supporting local infrastructure that has been repurposed (schools, clinics, stadiums), and establishing routine dialogue mechanisms that bring together local leaders, refugee representatives, women’s groups, and youth. These platforms help resolve grievances early and reduce the risk of scapegoating.

4) Strengthen screening while keeping camps civilian and humanitarian
The objective is not militarization—it is preventing armed actors from exploiting displacement flows. Screening at entry points should be improved during registration in a protection-respecting manner, in coordination with UNHCR. Individuals identified as armed or linked to armed groups should be separated, disarmed, and kept away from civilian populations. Camp rules must prohibit weapons, recruitment, intimidation, and political coercion, supported by consistent enforcement and trusted reporting channels. Gender-based violence prevention and response should be reinforced through lighting, safer WASH design, confidential reporting, and survivor care, since exploitation and GBV can rise sharply in overcrowded settings and rapidly destabilize communities.

5) Maintain public order through disciplined, non-escalatory security management
Security forces are under pressure, but heavy-handed tactics can backfire. Camp-adjacent policing should prioritize community engagement, de-escalation, and predictable presence rather than intimidation. Daily coordination between camp managers, humanitarian agencies, local administration, and police should be institutionalized to manage queues, disputes, and protection incidents. Small issues—such as theft, distribution tensions, and rumor-driven panic—should be addressed quickly before they escalate.

6) Improve border and lake monitoring to reduce spillover risk
Land crossings and Lake Tanganyika routes require stronger monitoring and coordination. Burundi should increase patrols and observation at key entry points and known informal routes, while strengthening lake-side landing controls and emergency response capacity for boat incidents. Information-sharing through relevant regional mechanisms should be improved to prevent misunderstandings and manage cross-border incidents rapidly.

7) Intensify regional diplomacy to address the root driver: conflict escalation in South Kivu
Humanitarian action cannot substitute for political and security progress in eastern DRC. Burundi should push for dedicated EAC/ICGLR engagement focused on South Kivu and displacement fallout, promote structured channels for incident verification and rapid deconfliction, and support consistent regional messaging against proxy escalation. Diplomatic pressure should focus on ceasefire compliance and credible negotiations that reduce the likelihood of further mass displacement.

8) Mobilize urgent funding and surge support
Burundi’s appeal should be treated as a stability investment. Donors and partners should prioritize rapid financing to prevent breakdown of food and WASH services, deploy surge capacity for health, WASH engineering, logistics, protection, and camp coordination, and support national systems that are under extraordinary pressure, including disease surveillance and medical supply chains.

9) Begin early planning for durable solutions to avoid protracted encampment risks
If displacement extends into mid-2026, long-term camp stagnation could become a security risk, particularly among youth. Planning should begin early to track conditions for safe voluntary return, strengthen education access and structured youth activities, and develop livelihoods and protection programming that reduces idleness and vulnerability. Development actors should be engaged to support refugee-hosting districts so emergency assistance does not become the only response.

Strategic takeaway (ASA lens)

The decisive factor is whether Burundi and partners can stabilize living conditions quickly while maintaining the civilian character of camps and preventing host community backlash. Disease outbreaks, resource competition, misinformation, and infiltration fears are the main accelerants of instability. A coordinated response—Burundian-led, regionally supported, and internationally resourced—can still contain the crisis. If humanitarian conditions continue to degrade, the risk increases that Burundi’s emergency becomes the next node in a wider Great Lakes destabilization cycle.