JNIM’s Ongoing Fuel Embargo in Mali

Monthly Summary (December 2025)

Overview

During December, Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) sustained and intensified its fuel embargo campaign in Mali by repeatedly targeting fuel convoys and related infrastructure along key supply routes leading from southern and central Mali toward Bamako. Activity remained concentrated on major transport corridors, particularly in Sikasso Region, where multiple attacks were recorded along the RN7 in Bougouni cercle. The pattern of incidents indicates a deliberate effort to disrupt fuel circulation, degrade confidence among private transporters, and impose sustained logistical pressure on the authorities without requiring territorial control.

Situation Update

Fuel convoys operating under escort continued to face elevated threat levels, with repeated use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), small arms fire, and arson attacks against tanker trucks. On 06 December, a tanker convoy under FAMa escort was struck by IEDs and gunfire between Sido and Kéléya, resulting in casualties and material damage. A UNSMS field mission present in the area at the time was temporarily interrupted; however, movement was allowed to resume later that same day.

Subsequent incidents demonstrated persistent targeting of convoy routes and fuel-related facilities along the same axis. On 10 December, JNIM attacked the Kéléya forestry post along RN7, during which a tanker truck was set on fire. Further attacks followed on 18 December, when five empty tankers were burned between Sido and Zambroula. On 25 December, an escorted convoy was again targeted by an IED at the entrance of Sido, reinforcing the assessment that the RN7 remains a high-risk corridor for escorted fuel movements.

Threat Messaging and Coercion of Economic Actors

JNIM reinforced its operational posture through intimidation aimed at private-sector participation in fuel distribution. On 11 December, an audio message in Bambara circulated through open-source channels and was attributed to Mahmoud Barry, described as a member of JNIM’s Shura Council. The message nominated transporters and economic operators linked to fuel distribution as “priority targets,” accusing them of supporting Malian authorities by enabling fuel supplies allegedly used in military operations against JNIM. The combination of kinetic attacks and public threats appears intended to deter commercial cooperation with state-led mitigation efforts and to increase disruption through psychological pressure.

Infrastructure Disruption

In parallel to convoy interdiction, JNIM-linked actions affected broader infrastructure reliability. Between 04–05 December, an attempted sabotage targeted the bridge between Kébila and Massala along RN30 in Kolondiéba cercle, Sikasso Region. Additional disruptive activity was recorded against telecommunications infrastructure, with vandalism reported on 12, 17, and 22 December across multiple localities in Sikasso and Koulikoro Regions. These incidents contribute to wider movement and commercial disruption, amplify security risks along supply routes, and degrade communications resilience in already contested areas.

Political Context

The operating environment was further complicated by political developments. On 05 December, an opposition front titled the Coalition des forces pour la République (CFR) was announced by exiled leaders, including Imam Mahmoud Dicko. The CFR framed resistance to the current regime as a national duty and called for a national dialogue that would include extremist and separatist armed groups, notably JNIM and the Front de Libération de l'Azawad (FLA). This position contrasts with the authorities’ continued rejection of engagement with such actors and introduces additional political pressure amid the ongoing economic and security strain. Dicko remains a notable figure with a demonstrated capacity to mobilize support, having played a prominent role during the 2020 protest movement and serving previously as president of Mali’s High Islamic Council.

Assessment

The December escalation indicates JNIM reasserted pressure on fuel and logistics networks following a brief period in November when convoy attacks were reportedly less frequent, allowing intermittent fuel deliveries to Bamako. The concentration of incidents in Sikasso Region—particularly along RN7—highlights the area’s strategic significance as a southern gateway linking Mali’s supply routes to Côte d’Ivoire and Guinea. This trend aligns with reporting that insecurity and shortages in southern Mali have contributed to displacement and cross-border movement toward Côte d’Ivoire.

Malian authorities reportedly achieved localized operational gains through counter-terrorism actions and reinforced convoy escort measures. These adaptations appear to have reduced losses during convoy movement and contributed to a relative improvement in fuel availability in Bamako compared to the start of the crisis. Additional fuel inflows through eastern routes were also reported, including the arrival on 22 November of a convoy of fuel trucks from Niger.

Despite these measures, sustaining heavily escorted convoys requires substantial security resources, and the prolonged fuel crisis continues to complicate broader operational prioritization. JNIM’s continued use of intimidation messaging targeting transporters and companies increases the likelihood of voluntary withdrawal or reduced operating tempo by private actors along high-risk corridors, potentially amplifying disruption even when escorts are available. Attacks against transport infrastructure and telecommunications further reinforce this coercive strategy by increasing costs, uncertainty, and operational delays.

Implications for UN Operations

The prevailing threat environment along key corridors is likely to sustain movement constraints and cause operational disruptions in the near term. Field movements along high-risk axes—particularly in southern approaches and contested transit routes—remain vulnerable to IED risk, ambushes, and indirect disruption linked to infrastructure sabotage. As long as JNIM sustains pressure through both attacks and public threats, delays, rerouting requirements, and short-notice mobility restrictions should be anticipated, especially in areas where private transport capacity becomes constrained due to security concerns.