Mosi-3 (“Will for Peace 2026”) — Strategic Implications for African Security and Geopolitics

Executive Summary

In January 2026, South Africa hosted the multilateral naval exercise Mosi-3, rebranded Will for Peace 2026, involving China, Russia, and Iran. While operationally limited, the exercise carried high symbolic and strategic weight. It marked a high-visibility joint appearance of Chinese, Russian, and Iranian naval forces in African waters under South African hosting—signalling a growing willingness among non-Western powers to project security presence and political messaging in a strategically critical maritime zone.

The primary impact is not military but geopolitical. Africa—and South Africa in particular—is becoming an arena of great-power security signalling, with implications for how diplomatic alignment is perceived, how investor risk is priced, and how maritime influence around African sea routes may evolve. The key point is that this exercise signals strategic proximity, but it does not by itself confirm durable security alignment or binding commitments.

What Happened

The exercise, framed publicly as maritime security cooperation, took place from January 9–16, 2026 in waters near Cape Town, at the junction of the Indian and Atlantic Oceans. South Africa hosted, with participating naval elements from China, Russia, and Iran. China played a prominent role and deployed the destroyer Tangshan and supply ship Taihu. Russia deployed the corvette Stoikiy and the oiler Yelnya. Iran’s participation included its 103rd Flotilla, including IRIS Makran. The stated focus was conventional and broadly acceptable—anti-piracy, search-and-rescue, and maritime security drills—yet the political signalling was far more consequential than the operational content.

Strategic Meaning

Mosi-3 functioned less as training and more as strategic signalling. It blurred the boundary between economic cooperation—often discussed under BRICS and broader Global South diplomacy—and security messaging, without necessarily creating a formal security bloc. It also placed Africa, and South Africa specifically, inside a multipolar contest where “presence” can carry as much meaning as capability. Even if the tactical scope was limited, the exercise added to a pattern in which external naval deployments in African waters are becoming more frequent and more politically legible.

This matters because it increases the likelihood that Africa’s maritime environment will be shaped not only by African security needs, but also by external signalling cycles. In other words, Africa risks being pulled into a strategic tempo set elsewhere, even when African governments retain formal sovereignty and decision-making control.

Motivations of Participants

Each actor had a distinct incentive, and the overlap lies mainly in optics. For South Africa, hosting reinforces strategic autonomy and Global South leadership while resisting pressure to align exclusively with Western frameworks. For China, the exercise supports blue-water reach and the normalization of presence along key sea lanes, while keeping optionality around port access and logistics. For Russia, it is a way to signal relevance and reach amid diplomatic isolation, and to keep alternate channels open. For Iran, participation demonstrates long-range presence and strengthens alignment signalling with China and Russia while messaging resistance to containment.

Why South Africa Matters

South Africa’s location sits astride a maritime route that becomes more vital whenever disruptions in the Red Sea and the Suez region divert shipping south. That strategic geography gives Pretoria leverage, because it can credibly present itself as a stakeholder in global trade resilience, not merely a regional actor.

By hosting Mosi-3, South Africa demonstrated convening power and signalled that its foreign policy is not automatically anchored to Western expectations. That can strengthen its Global South credibility, but it also creates friction risk—particularly where the exercise is read externally as political alignment rather than pragmatic autonomy. The signal is not only international: hosting decisions also land inside South African domestic politics and can become a proxy debate about neutrality, alignment, and economic consequences.

Implications for Africa

The wider implication is that Africa is moving from a Western-dominated security environment toward a more multipolar marketplace of partnerships. For some states this may increase bargaining power, as external actors compete for influence and access. For others it may increase exposure, as great-power competition becomes more visible in African waters and the incentives to “read” political meaning into routine maritime activity intensify.

The naval balance dimension is less about immediate warfighting capability and more about logistics, access, and governance. Port calls, replenishment, and maintenance support become strategic assets, and the political meaning attached to them grows over time. African waters may gradually shift from being treated as neutral trade corridors to becoming geopolitically coded spaces—where exercises, visits, and even rumours of basing arrangements carry diplomatic weight.

There is also a practical risk that Africa’s operational maritime priorities become secondary to external theatre. Illegal fishing, trafficking and smuggling networks, piracy and armed robbery in specific corridors, port security, critical infrastructure protection, and the persistent capacity needs around maritime domain awareness and coast guard readiness are the issues African states must solve. If external engagements do not translate into capability gains in these areas, the continent may receive symbolism rather than security.

Market and Investment Effects

The most important transmission channel is perception, not force. High-profile security signalling can raise the geopolitical risk premium, increase compliance and reputational friction, and shift capital allocation—particularly in sectors exposed to trade, insurance, ports, infrastructure finance, and dual-use technology. This can elevate financing costs even where domestic fundamentals remain unchanged, because risk pricing responds to political interpretation as much as to measurable operational threat.

What to Watch

Whether this becomes a real “normalization” trend depends on what follows. The most revealing indicators will be repetition and depth: how often similar exercises occur, whether they increase in operational complexity over time, and whether patterns of port access become routine. It will also matter whether there are formal logistics arrangements, structured training pipelines, or deeper maritime domain awareness cooperation. Finally, the role of regional governance is decisive: if AU/SADC frameworks shape the agenda, Africa gains leverage; if they merely host external agendas, Africa’s room to set priorities narrows.

Bottom Line

Mosi-3 was not about naval manoeuvres. It was about positioning.

It signalled that Africa is increasingly treated as strategic terrain, that security signalling is beginning to follow economic realignments, and that geopolitical messaging now directly influences African risk pricing. The central question is whether African states can leverage multipolar attention without becoming subordinate to it—and whether external engagement produces measurable capability gains aligned with African priorities, rather than great-power theatre. That will determine whether Africa emerges as a strategic actor, or remains a strategic arena.

African Security Analysis (ASA) Perspective

From an African security standpoint, the Mosi 3 / “Will for Peace 2026” naval exercise marks a significant moment in the continent’s evolving geopolitical landscape. It suggests that Africa is no longer merely a passive arena where external powers compete, but a space where key African states—South Africa foremost—can shape access, optics, and diplomatic signalling among global rivals.

For African analysts, the most consequential outcome is not the tactical value of the drills, but the precedent they establish. By convening a coalition outside traditional Western security frameworks, South Africa broadened the menu of visible security partnerships available to African states. This diversification can enhance bargaining power, but it also introduces new layers of complexity. African governments will now need to operate in a more crowded maritime environment where great-power signalling may sometimes overshadow African operational priorities.

The exercise also underscores Africa’s rising importance in global maritime competition. With instability in the Red Sea and Suez region redirecting global shipping around the Cape of Good Hope, African waters have become critical to global trade resilience. In this context, the presence of Chinese, Russian, and Iranian vessels in South African waters is more than symbolic. It reflects a contest over who will shape the security architecture of the Indian and South Atlantic Oceans, and it increases the likelihood that external naval deployments will become more frequent, more strategic, and more politically charged—even when publicly framed as routine maritime security cooperation.

At the same time, the geopolitical signalling embedded in Mosi 3 carries real economic implications. Geopolitics now functions as a premium: diplomatic choices can influence investor sentiment, market access, and the posture of multilateral institutions. South Africa’s perceived alignment posture—whether intended or not—will shape how external partners assess risk, trust, and long-term cooperation. This dynamic will increasingly affect not only South Africa, but any African state that diversifies security partnerships beyond traditional Western anchors.

Ultimately, Mosi 3 illustrates both the opportunities and vulnerabilities of Africa’s emerging strategic autonomy. The continent sits at the intersection of global maritime routes, global power rivalries, and global economic flows. African states can leverage this position to secure better terms of engagement, but doing so will require disciplined diplomacy, credible maritime governance, regional coordination, and a clear articulation of African security priorities—especially around coastal protection, enforcement against illicit maritime economies, and maritime domain awareness. Without these, Africa risks becoming a stage for external competition rather than a shaper of its own maritime future.

In the eyes of African security experts, the message is clear: Africa has entered a new era of strategic relevance. The challenge now is to convert relevance into influence, and influence into measurable, long-term security gains for the continent.

Core Insight

Africa is entering a multipolar security era.
Mosi-3 marks the moment it became visible.

How Africa navigates this shift will shape its sovereignty, stability, and economic trajectory over the next decade.