MPLJ Double Attack on Oil Infrastructure in Niger

Monthly Summary (December 2025)

Overview

In December, the Mouvement Patriotique pour la Liberté et la Justice (MPLJ) claimed responsibility for two attacks targeting the Niger–Benin oil pipeline, underscoring the group’s continued focus on high-impact economic infrastructure. Both incidents occurred in Diffa Region within the Agadem oil zone, reinforcing concerns over the persistent vulnerability of critical extractive assets despite ongoing security deployments. The attacks form part of a broader MPLJ messaging campaign positioning the group as an opponent of national authorities and foreign-linked extractive operations.

Situation Update

The first incident was reported on 06 December at the Dibella site, followed by a second attack on 21 December south of the locality of Jaouro. MPLJ publicly claimed both actions through communiqués circulated between November and December. In these statements, the group framed the attacks as part of an escalating campaign against the current Nigerien authorities and companies operating in the extractive sector, warning of further operations until its political demands are met.

MPLJ Profile and Grievances

MPLJ emerged in August 2024 under the leadership of Moussa Kounaï, following his split from the Front Patriotique de Libération (FPL), another post-coup armed movement in Niger. The group portrays itself as an anti-regime actor, citing alleged marginalization and abuses against northern communities as key grievances. MPLJ also calls for the restoration of constitutional order and the release of former President Mohamed Bazoum.

The group’s December operations are consistent with its prior activity profile. MPLJ has previously claimed sabotage targeting the pipeline, conducted ambushes against defence and security forces, and issued threats against foreign operators, including explicit calls for international companies to leave Niger. This pattern suggests an approach cantered on disruption, coercion, and propaganda rather than sustained conventional engagement.

Significance of the Niger–Benin Pipeline

The Niger–Benin oil pipeline originates in the Agadem oil fields and crosses approximately 1,000 km of Nigerien territory before entering Benin, making it a strategic national asset and a primary revenue-generating component of the state’s economic structure. As such, it represents a high-value target for armed actors seeking to weaken government legitimacy, strain public finances, and deter international investment.

Despite efforts by Nigerien authorities to enhance pipeline security through deployments along key segments, repeated attacks over recent months indicate ongoing exposure across wide geographic areas. Maintaining continuous protection across the full pipeline corridor remains structurally difficult, leaving gaps that armed groups can exploit with limited resources.

Assessment

While earlier MPLJ activity appeared to prioritize symbolic warning actions and limited disruption, the December incidents—if accurately represented in MPLJ claims—reportedly affected infrastructure functionality. The occurrence of two attacks within the same month and operating area suggests an intent to apply sustained pressure on strategic economic assets and demonstrate resilience in the face of security measures.

There are no indications that MPLJ possesses the capability to move beyond hit-and-run attacks and propaganda dissemination. The group’s operational approach appears geared toward economic coercion, reputational damage, and political leverage rather than territorial control. This strategy enables MPLJ to remain relevant by generating high-profile disruption while avoiding the resource burden and exposure risks associated with holding ground.

Wider Security Implications

MPLJ activity adds complexity to Niger’s already challenging security environment, which is simultaneously shaped by extremist threats across multiple regions. The presence of multiple armed actors with distinct motivations and operating areas increases strain on national security forces, complicates prioritization of deployments, and expands the overall operational risk footprint.

For foreign companies operating in the extractive sector, the persistence of attacks against strategic energy infrastructure elevates security costs, increases uncertainty around continuity of operations, and raises collateral risk for movements and projects in affected areas. The continued targeting of high-value economic infrastructure is therefore likely to remain a key driver of instability and operational limitation in the near term.