When
Location
Topic
8 okt. 2025 10:48
Tanzania
Governance, Domestic Policy, Elections, Corruption, Civil Security, Human Rights, Freedom of expression
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Tanzania: Tightening Political Space Ahead of the 2025 Elections

African Security Analysis (ASA) Country Brief - October 2025
Public Brief – Political and Governance Analysis

Executive Summary

Tanzania is approaching its October 2025 general elections amid growing concern over the shrinking space for political opposition, the media, and civil society. While the country remains stable and the ruling Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) retains broad institutional control, recent developments—including the detention of key opposition figures and new restrictions on digital communication—suggest that the electoral process is becoming increasingly constrained.

President Samia Suluhu Hassan, who initially signalled a reformist approach following the late President Magufuli’s tenure, now appears to be consolidating power through legal, administrative, and regulatory measures. This trend aligns Tanzania more closely with patterns of competitive authoritarianism, in which elections occur but the outcome heavily favours incumbents.

ASA assesses that the 2025 elections represent a critical juncture: the choices made by political institutions in the coming months will shape Tanzania’s governance trajectory for years to come.

Political Context

Since independence, the CCM has dominated Tanzanian politics, maintaining continuous rule through its strong organizational reach and integration with the state. The reintroduction of multiparty democracy in 1992 did not fundamentally alter this balance, as opposition parties remained fragmented and resource-poor compared to the ruling party.

When President Samia Suluhu Hassan assumed office in 2021, many observers expected a more open political environment. Her early actions—lifting bans on public rallies, reauthorizing some independent media outlets, and initiating dialogue with opposition figures—were seen as positive signals.

However, these initial reforms have gradually stalled. Over the past year, the government has intensified control over political competition and public discourse, raising new questions about institutional independence and democratic accountability.

Opposition Suppression and Legal Challenges

Two major opposition figures have been sidelined ahead of the election.
Tundu Lissu, a prominent leader and former presidential candidate, has been detained since April 2025 on treason charges. The severity of these charges and the opacity of the legal process have drawn domestic and international criticism.

Meanwhile, another opposition contender, Luhaga Mpina, was initially barred from submitting nomination papers. Though a court briefly reinstated his candidacy, the electoral commission swiftly overturned the decision, effectively excluding him from the presidential race.

With both leading challengers removed, the CCM faces little credible opposition at the national level, and the playing field for the 2025 election appears highly uneven.

Information Control and Digital Restrictions

The government has imposed increasing restrictions on online communication platforms.
Popular global services such as X (formerly Twitter), Clubhouse, and Telegram have been blocked, while Tanzania’s own JamiiForums—long valued for its independent citizen reporting—has been taken offline. Internet slowdowns and access restrictions have also been reported at politically sensitive moments.

These actions limit freedom of expression, hinder transparency, and make it more difficult for citizens and journalists to access independent information during a critical political period.

Governance and Stability Implications

Tanzania remains comparatively stable in regional terms, with low levels of overt violence and sustained state capacity. However, the concentration of power in the executive and the erosion of checks and balances carry long-term governance risks.

If opposition leaders continue to face intimidation or exclusion, and if citizens perceive that the electoral process lacks fairness, public confidence in institutions may weaken. While widespread unrest is unlikely in the immediate term, localized protests or civic mobilization could emerge, particularly in urban areas where political dissent has historically been strongest.

Internationally, Tanzania’s image as a reliable and democratic partner could come under pressure. Development partners and regional blocs may reassess cooperation frameworks if governance standards continue to decline.

Assessment

African Security Analysis (ASA) assesses that Tanzania is transitioning from a competitive authoritarian system—where opposition participation exists but is constrained—toward a more tightly controlled political order. The use of legal instruments and regulatory bodies to manage political competition reflects a strategic shift toward formalizing dominance rather than relying solely on coercion.

At the same time, the state’s strong institutional legacy and emphasis on order make outright instability unlikely in the short term. Instead, the risks lie in gradual institutional erosion and reduced policy accountability, both of which can undermine long-term governance resilience.

Outlook

The months ahead will be decisive.
Key indicators to monitor include:

  • The progress and transparency of Tundu Lissu’s treason trial.
  • The operational independence of the electoral commission.
  • Access to digital and traditional media during the campaign period.
  • The treatment of domestic and international election observers.

If these indicators continue to deteriorate, Tanzania’s 2025 elections will likely entrench one-party dominance rather than renew democratic competition.

For now, ASA concludes that Tanzania’s political system remains stable but increasingly restrictive governed more by control than by consensus.

End of Brief
© 2025 African Security Analysis (ASA). Reproduction permitted with attribution.

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