Eritrea Withdraws from IGAD: Strategic Isolation and Renewed Fractures in the Horn of Africa

Executive Summary

Eritrea has abruptly announced its withdrawal from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), reigniting geopolitical tensions across the Horn of Africa. Coming barely two years after its re-entry, the decision underscores the fragility of regional multilateral cooperation and highlights Eritrea’s enduring preference for strategic isolation over collective security frameworks.

Behind the official rhetoric lies a complex web of regional rivalries, alliance politics, and great-power alignments, particularly involving Ethiopia, Egypt, and the ongoing conflict in Sudan. Eritrea’s departure further weakens IGAD’s cohesion at a time when the Horn of Africa is facing overlapping security crises, from civil wars to interstate tensions.

A Sudden Withdrawal with Strategic Implications

On Friday, 12 December, Eritrea formally announced its withdrawal from IGAD, the eight-member East African regional bloc that includes Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, and Uganda. The announcement took regional observers by surprise, given that Asmara had only rejoined the organization in 2023 after a long absence.

The move highlights deep-rooted political distrust between Eritrea and the organization’s dominant members and confirms that Eritrea’s reintegration into regional mechanisms was never fully consolidated.

Asmara’s Justification: “No Tangible Strategic Benefit”

In a strongly worded communiqué, Eritrea’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs accused IGAD of having “failed and continuing to fail to uphold its statutory obligations,” thereby undermining its own legitimacy and legal mandate. According to Asmara, IGAD offers “no tangible strategic advantage” to its members and contributes little to regional stability.

This rhetoric comes at a moment when IGAD is struggling to manage multiple crises. Sudan remains locked in a devastating civil war, Ethiopia continues to face internal instability, and Somalia’s security situation remains precarious. IGAD, for its part, expressed regret over Eritrea’s decision and encouraged Asmara to reconsider, while noting that Eritrea had not actively participated in IGAD activities since its return in 2023.

The Ethiopia–Egypt Rivalry at the Core

Beyond institutional criticism, Eritrea’s withdrawal is best understood through the lens of regional power rivalries. Relations between Eritrea and Ethiopia—despite the 2018 rapprochement—remain structurally fragile and strategically competitive.

IGAD is currently led by Workneh Gebeyehu, a former Ethiopian foreign minister, reinforcing perceptions in Asmara that the organization is politically aligned with Addis Ababa.

The conflict in Sudan further complicates the picture. Most IGAD member states are perceived as leaning toward the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), while the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) receive backing from Egypt—Ethiopia’s principal regional rival, particularly over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).

By withdrawing from IGAD, Eritrea—historically closer to Egypt—distances itself from a bloc viewed as structurally aligned with Ethiopian regional interests. This move further entrenches polarization in the Horn of Africa.

A Pattern of Strategic Isolation

This is not Eritrea’s first departure from IGAD. The country suspended its membership in 2007 and remained outside the organization for over a decade before briefly rejoining in 2023. Under President Isaias Afwerki, who has ruled since independence in 1993, Eritrea has consistently pursued a self-reliant, security-centric foreign policy, minimizing multilateral commitments.

Eritrea remains one of the world’s most closed political systems, with limited diplomatic engagement and minimal regional economic integration. In this context, withdrawal from IGAD represents less a rupture than a return to a familiar strategic posture.

Impact on IGAD and Regional Stability

While symbolically significant, Eritrea’s exit is unlikely to paralyze IGAD’s operations. The organization has historically functioned amid internal divisions and partial disengagement by member states.

However, the withdrawal underscores:

• the weak institutional authority of regional organizations in the Horn of Africa,
• the dominance of national interest over collective security,
• and the growing difficulty of managing regional crises through multilateral frameworks.

At a time of heightened instability, Eritrea’s departure further narrows the space for coordinated regional responses.

Conclusion: Fragmentation Over Cooperation

Eritrea’s withdrawal from IGAD is a strategic signal rather than an administrative move. It reflects enduring rivalries, competing alliance structures, and a regional environment in which multilateral institutions struggle to overcome geopolitical fault lines.

The decision reinforces the reality that, in the Horn of Africa, cooperation remains fragile and reversible, particularly when national security calculations collide with collective mechanisms. As crises deepen across Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia, IGAD’s capacity to act as a stabilizing platform will remain constrained tested not only by external conflicts, but by the internal disengagement of its own members.

Region: Horn of Africa
Department: Regional Geopolitics & Multilateral Institutions