CAR: MINUSCA Transition Planning Confronts Persistent Border and Armed-Group Risks

Executive Assessment

The Central African Republic has made important progress in stabilisation, electoral completion and restoration of state authority. However, the security environment remains uneven and vulnerable to reversal, particularly in the north-east, south-east and border areas affected by the Sudan conflict. The Security Council’s November mandate renewal for MINUSCA will therefore centre on a difficult balance: supporting national ownership and a gradual transition while retaining sufficient international capacity to deter armed groups, protect civilians and prevent renewed security gaps.

A conditions-based transition remains the most credible option. Current threats in remote areas, continued cross-border armed activity and limited state reach indicate that a rapid drawdown would carry significant operational and protection risks.

Transition Must Follow Conditions, Not Calendar Deadlines

The CAR Government and MINUSCA have established an interministerial mechanism to assess national readiness for the progressive transfer of responsibilities. Their joint assessment supports a phased, conditions-based approach that aligns task transfer with demonstrated national capacity and avoids weakening hard-won security gains.

The Secretary-General has recommended retaining MINUSCA’s core security functions, particularly civilian protection and deterrence in remote and inaccessible locations. He has also cautioned against further reductions in uniformed personnel before conditions allow. This position reflects the gap between political progress in Bangui and the operational reality in peripheral areas.

MINUSCA currently deploys approximately 10,292 military personnel against an authorised ceiling of 14,046. The Secretary-General has recommended a revised military strength of 12,000 personnel, combined with continued emphasis on national capacity-building, transition planning and coordination with Central African authorities.

North-East: Sudan Spillover and Armed-Group Mobility

The north-east remains exposed to cross-border insecurity linked to the Sudan conflict. Armed elements affiliated with the Front populaire pour la renaissance de la Centrafrique (FPRC) and the Mouvement démocratique pour le rassemblement du peuple centrafricain (MDRPC) reportedly operate along the Sudanese border.

Their reported seizure of Am-Dafock in Vakaga prefecture displaced thousands of civilians, many of whom sought protection near a MINUSCA temporary operating base. Attacks against the base, which injured six peacekeepers, demonstrate the direct operational risk facing the mission.

The Sudan conflict is likely to continue shaping CAR’s security environment through armed-group movement, illicit weapons flows, displacement, cross-border trafficking and competition over strategic routes. The tri-border area linking CAR, Chad and Sudan requires sustained monitoring and stronger coordination among national, regional and international actors.

South-East: Limited State Presence and Persistent Armed Threats

In the south-east, the Azande Ani Kpi Gbe militia and the Lord’s Resistance Army continue to threaten isolated communities. The LRA reportedly remains active in remote locations where state institutions and security presence are limited. Recent incidents included killings and child abductions.

Clashes involving AAKG elements and Central African Armed Forces, supported by other security personnel, further illustrate the fragmented nature of local security arrangements. The presence of multiple armed actors, transhumance routes and mining sites increases the risk of recurring violence, exploitation and civilian displacement.

Security Council Choices at a Strategic Inflection Point

The Council’s central decision is whether to renew MINUSCA with sufficient authority and capability to manage the transition responsibly. A one-year renewal that preserves priority tasks, supports national capacity-building and establishes measurable transition benchmarks would be the most operationally credible approach.

Key priorities should include:

• Retaining MINUSCA’s civilian-protection and deterrence role in high-risk border and remote areas;
• Supporting CAR authorities to strengthen border management and counter illicit arms movements;
• Improving monitoring of armed-group activity along the Sudan and Chad borders;
• Coordinating relevant findings and recommendations under the CAR and Sudan sanctions regimes;
• Linking any task transfer to verified readiness, resources and sustained security conditions;
• Maintaining close coordination with the AU, the UN Country Team and regional actors.

Council Dynamics

Most Security Council members support a gradual, coordinated and conditions-based transition. CAR authorities have also endorsed this approach, recognising the need to consolidate state capacity before assuming additional security responsibilities.

The United States has signalled greater interest in accelerating efficiency measures and mission drawdown, arguing that a static peacekeeping presence can itself create long-term dependency. This creates a central tension in mandate negotiations: members broadly agree on the objective of national ownership but differ on the pace at which MINUSCA should reduce its role.

The appointment of a new MINUSCA leadership team following the departure of Special Representative Valentine Rugwabiza may also influence the mission’s transition planning and political engagement.

Outlook

CAR is not returning to the large-scale conflict environment of previous years, but stability remains geographically uneven. National institutions have strengthened, yet armed groups retain the capacity to exploit remote areas, porous borders and weak state presence.

The most plausible near-term scenario is continued relative stability in major population centres alongside persistent insecurity in the north-east and south-east. The principal risk is that a poorly sequenced MINUSCA drawdown, combined with Sudan-related spillover, creates protection gaps that armed actors can rapidly exploit.

How ASA Can Support

African Security Analysis (ASA) provides independent security and political risk assessments to organisations with interests in the Central African Republic and the wider region.

Through continued monitoring, regional analysis and access to informed local perspectives, ASA can provide tailored intelligence, early warning and operational risk assessments to support informed decision-making. Particular attention is given to developments that may affect security conditions, political stability, cross-border dynamics and the operating environment for international organisations and commercial interests.

ASA's assessments are designed to help clients anticipate emerging risks, understand their implications and make informed strategic and operational decisions.