Central African Republic at a Strategic Crossroads

Post-Election Consolidation, Armed Fragmentation, and the Structural Fragility of Peace

Executive Summary

As of 23 February 2026, the Central African Republic (CAR) stands at a delicate juncture between incremental stabilization and persistent structural fragility. The UN Security Council’s latest review—based on the Secretary-General’s report (S/2026/71)—comes in the immediate aftermath of the 28 December 2025 combined elections and amid evolving security dynamics.

The current landscape can be summarized by five core realities:

1. Institutional continuity has been maintained through the re-election of President Faustin-Archange Touadéra.

2. Security incidents have decreased overall, particularly following renewed commitments to the 2019 Political Agreement (APPR-RCA).

3. Localized armed threats persist, especially in the south-east.

4. Human rights violations remain systemic, despite aggregate improvements.

5. MINUSCA faces severe financial constraints, directly affecting operational reach and deterrence capacity.

CAR is not experiencing collapse. However, stabilization remains conditional and reversible.

Political Landscape: Electoral Continuity Without Full Consensus

1. Electoral Outcome and Institutional Validation

The 28 December 2025 elections proceeded with logistical and security support from MINUSCA. Ballot distribution, voter education campaigns, and joint security deployments with FACA and national police prevented widespread disruption.

President Touadéra secured approximately 76 percent of the vote, and the Constitutional Court certified the results on 19 January 2026.

From an institutional standpoint, the electoral cycle concluded without systemic breakdown—an achievement in a historically volatile environment.

2. Legitimacy Tensions

Despite procedural validation, political cohesion remains incomplete:

• Two presidential candidates challenged the results.
• The BRDC opposition coalition boycotted the elections and continues to question credibility.
• Calls for political dialogue remain unresolved.

The absence of large-scale post-election violence should not obscure the underlying legitimacy deficit among segments of the political opposition.

Without structured political dialogue, polarization could re-emerge in future cycles.

Security Environment: Stabilization with Structural Gaps

1. DDR Progress and Armed Group Recommitment

The recommitment of the 3R and UPC armed groups to the APPR-RCA in April 2025 has been operationally significant.

As of February 2026:

• 1,202 ex-combatants disarmed and demobilized since July 2025
• Approximately 6,000 total ex-combatants demobilized since 2019

The DDR trajectory indicates measurable progress. However, reintegration remains uneven and economically fragile.

Demobilization without sustainable reintegration risks latent remobilization.

2. Geographic Asymmetry of Stability

Security gains are regionally concentrated:

• West and north-east: Relative stabilization
• South-east: Persistent instability driven by AKKG militia
• Mining zones and transhumance corridors: Continued volatility
• Border areas (Sudan, South Sudan): Cross-border insecurity risks

The Azande Ani Kpi Gbe (AKKG) remains the most destabilizing actor in the south-east. Reported actions include:

• Electoral disruption
• Abductions of candidates and officials
• Attacks against FACA and MINUSCA
• Severe human rights abuses

Security stabilization is therefore uneven and fragile, not systemic.

Human Rights: Quantitative Improvement, Qualitative Risk

1. Statistical Decline in Violations

The reporting period shows:

• 24% reduction in documented violations
• 16% reduction in victim numbers

These trends correlate with armed group ceasefires and improved territorial control.

2. Persistent Structural Violations

However, several patterns persist:

• Conflict-related sexual violence remains widespread but underreported.
• Grave violations against children increased.
• Armed group splinter elements continue predatory behaviour.

The decline in incidents does not yet indicate institutional deterrence—rather, it reflects partial armed stabilization.

Without strengthened judicial enforcement and territorial state authority, improvements may plateau.

Accountability Architecture: The Special Criminal Court Under Pressure

The Special Criminal Court (SCC) remains central to CAR’s transitional justice framework.

Recent developments:

• Trial opened against six individuals accused of crimes against humanity and war crimes (2014 period).
• Two additional cases involving ten suspects, including former President François Bozizé.

These proceedings represent critical progress toward accountability.

However, funding shortfalls threaten operational continuity.

If the SCC weakens, the deterrent effect of justice diminishes—potentially undermining long-term peace consolidation.

Justice remains one of the most fragile pillars of stabilization.

MINUSCA: Operational Mandate Under Financial Constraint

1. Liquidity Crisis Impact

As of 5 February 2026:

• Only 58% of the mission’s annual budget received.
• Strict expenditure controls imposed.
• Reduced patrol mobility.
• Prioritization of core tasks over expansion activities.

This directly affects:

• Civilian protection capacity
• Rapid response operations
• Border stabilization
• Support to DDR expansion

Peacekeeping effectiveness now intersects directly with UN financial solvency.

2. Strategic Debate on Mandate Adaptation

The United States has signalled interest in:

• Transitioning certain responsibilities to national authorities.
• Reducing or phasing out specific mission components (e.g., electoral division).
• Rebalancing tasks toward state-led stabilization.

A formal report on possible adjustments is expected by 15 September 2026.

Premature downsizing, however, risks exposing fragile security gains.

Regional and Cross-Border Dynamics

CAR’s stability cannot be isolated from regional dynamics:

• Sudan instability risks spillover.
• South Sudan border areas remain porous.
• Armed networks exploit mineral corridors and pastoral routes.

Border management capacity remains limited.

MINUSCA’s reduced mobility due to financial strain further complicates deterrence.

Regional volatility remains a latent threat multiplier.

Strategic Risk Outlook (6–12 Months)

Scenario 1: Gradual Consolidation (Moderate Probability)

DDR expands, AKKG fragmentation weakens, and political dialogue mitigates tensions.

Scenario 2: Stabilization Plateau (High Probability)

Security incidents remain low overall, but localized volatility persists without structural reform.

Scenario 3: Reversal Under Financial Shock (Low–Moderate Probability)

Budget constraints significantly reduce MINUSCA’s deterrence capacity, emboldening armed splinter groups.

The most likely trajectory is managed fragility, not rapid normalization.

Conclusion: Conditional Stability in a Constrained Environment

As of February 2026, the Central African Republic is neither in acute crisis nor in irreversible recovery.

Key observations:

• Electoral continuity achieved.
• DDR progressing but incomplete.
• Security improved but geographically uneven.
• Human rights violations reduced yet persistent.
• Justice advancing but financially vulnerable.
• Peacekeeping under fiscal strain.

CAR’s stabilization now depends on three interlinked variables:

Sustained international financial commitment.

1. Deepened reintegration and accountability mechanisms.

2. Political inclusion beyond procedural elections.

3. Without reinforcement of these pillars, stabilization risks stagnation.

The trajectory remains positive—but structurally fragile.