Growing Security Crisis in Somalia: Mogadishu at Risk Al-Shabaab’s Rapid Advance in Middle and Lower Shabelle

Overview

Al-Shabaab is making swift territorial gains in the Middle and Lower Shabelle regions, pushing back Somali National Army (SNA) forces and increasing the threat to Mogadishu. Government troops are struggling with heavy losses, and clan militias that once supported them are now withdrawing. Despite receiving Turkish military aid—including drones and attack helicopters—the Somali government lacks the well-organized ground forces needed to stop the jihadist offensive. Without urgent military and political reforms, Mogadishu could soon be under siege.

Al-Shabaab’s Offensiv

• March 26, 2025: Al-Shabaab captured an SNA base in Masjid Ali Gadud, killing multiple soldiers.
• The group now controls key bridges and towns in Lower Shabelle, leaving Afgooye as the last significant government-held city.
• Fighters are gathering around Afgooye, launching mortar strikes against SNA positions.

Government and Militia Struggles

• Many SNA soldiers have deserted, with commanders staying in Mogadishu rather than leading their troops.
• In Jowhar, dozens of ma’awiisley militia members abandoned their weapons, further weakening defenses.

Al-Shabaab’s Tactical Shift

• A new propaganda video from Al-Shabaab’s media wing, Al-Kataib, suggests that this is a well-planned, large-scale offensive rather than opportunistic attacks.
• Footage from Awdhegle shows the use of heavy machinery to destroy SNA fortifications, indicating an intent to prevent the government from reclaiming lost ground.

Turkish Military Support and Its Limitations

• Türkiye has deployed Akinci drones to strike Al-Shabaab targets, but airstrikes alone cannot compensate for the SNA’s lack of coordination.
• Turkish T-129 ATAK helicopters are expected to arrive soon, though their effectiveness remains uncertain given the SNA’s weakened ground forces.

Possible Scenarios

Mogadishu Under Siege (Most Likely in 4–6 Weeks)

• Al-Shabaab captures Afgooye and blocks all western access points to the capital.
• The group surrounds Mogadishu, cutting off supply routes and infiltrating city districts.
• Pro-government forces surrender or defect, similar to the fall of Mogadishu in 2006.

Government Stabilizes (Possible in 6–12 Weeks)

• The government regroups within Mogadishu with increased international military aid, preventing a complete collapse.
• However, without political reconciliation with influential Hawiye sub-clans, Al-Shabaab retains control over most of Middle and Lower Shabelle, keeping the city under constant threat.

Al-Shabaab Faces Internal Struggles (Unlikely, 12+ Weeks)

• Reports suggest Al-Shabaab’s leader, Abu Ubaidah, is in poor health, which could weaken internal cohesion.
• Infighting among jihadist factions might slow their advance, but this would depend on external factors beyond the Somali government’s control.

Conclusion

The Somali government faces a critical moment. If current trends continue, Mogadishu could soon be under direct threat. Military equipment alone will not stop Al-Shabaab—political engagement, clan alliances, and immediate security reforms are essential. Close monitoring and diplomatic efforts with key stakeholders are necessary to prevent a disaster.