Sudan/South Sudan — Abyei Between Two Wars: UNISFA at the Crossroads of Containment and Erosion

Field Security & Governance Brief | November 2025 based on UNSC consultations

Overview and Expected UN Action

In November 2025, the UN Security Council will review the mandate of the UN Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA) and the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism (JBVMM), both set to expire on 15 November. The renewal comes amid the collapse of Sudan’s internal security, persistent militarisation of Abyei, and political paralysis in both Khartoum and Juba.

UNISFA remains the only functional stabilising presence along the volatile Sudan–South Sudan border. Yet, its operational capacity has been severely constrained by Sudan’s internal conflict, restricted airspace, and logistical isolation of its northern sectors.

The Council is expected to renew the mandate for one year, but the review will likely reopen debates on UNISFA’s structure, political leverage, and viability under the UN’s liquidity crisis.

Political Stalemate: The Frozen Status of Abyei

According to the Secretary-General’s report (15 October), no progress has been achieved on determining Abyei’s final status — a dispute unresolved since the 2011 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The Abyei Joint Oversight Committee and the Joint Political and Security Mechanism, both co-chaired by Sudan and South Sudan, have remained dormant due to Khartoum’s war and Juba’s domestic uncertainty.

Without political engagement, Abyei has become a governance vacuum where competing security forces and paramilitaries operate unchecked. The absence of high-level dialogue reflects a shift from negotiation to silent militarisation, as each side entrenches its presence under the cover of national crises.

Security Situation: Rising Incidents and Dual Militarisation

UNISFA recorded 127 security incidents between April and September 2025 — a 40% increase from the previous reporting period — resulting in 34 deaths. Sporadic gunfire, ambushes, and looting near UN bases have intensified, particularly in the Amiet–Diffra corridor, a key economic artery connecting northern Abyei to Sudan.

RSF Expansion in Northern Abyei

The Rapid Support Forces (RSF), the dominant Sudanese paramilitary group, have established permanent checkpoints and patrols in Amiet and Dari, reportedly controlling local revenue collection points and detaining officials loyal to Khartoum. RSF elements have also forged tactical alliances with Misseriya tribal leaders, leveraging ethnic ties to consolidate northern control and access resource taxation networks.

These activities directly violate the 2011 Abyei Security Arrangement, transforming the region into an extension of Sudan’s war economy. UNISFA intelligence further indicates arms transfers and arbitrary arrests of Ngok Dinka civilians by RSF elements, exacerbating ethnic polarization.

SSPDF and SPLA-IO Clashes in Southern Abyei

In southern Abyei, forces from the South Sudan People’s Defence Forces (SSPDF) and the SPLA-IO (in opposition) clashed in early October, leaving 14 dead. The confrontation, reportedly over territorial control, highlights fragmented command structures and the absence of unified state control south of the boundary.

Following the violence, UNISFA evacuated over 190 civilians to its Kadhian and Rumamier bases, reinforcing its role as the sole civilian protection force in the area. However, SSPDF occupation of civilian structures and checkpoints obstructing UN patrols continue to restrict mission movement.

Operational Constraints: Conflict Spillover and Logistical Isolation

The ongoing war in Sudan has crippled UNISFA and JBVMM operations:

• Airspace closures have halted aerial monitoring and resupply.
• Contractors have withdrawn from Kadugli, leaving supply routes exposed to ambushes.
• The Gok Machar headquarters and two team sites remain non-operational.

UNISFA initiated a partial withdrawal from Kadugli in August, citing untenable security conditions, while ground patrols have replaced aerial reconnaissance to maintain a minimal presence.

Arms proliferation, cross-border infiltration, and criminality have surged across the Amiet–Diffra axis. Despite repeated requests, the deployment of three formed police units—authorized since Resolution 2469 (2019)—remains blocked by Sudan’s non-consent for a civilian Deputy Head of Mission.

Political Engagement and Mission Adaptation

Between June and September, UNISFA leadership conducted five missions to Juba and one to Port Sudan to re-engage both governments. However, both capitals remain preoccupied:

• Khartoum is consumed by the RSF–SAF civil war.
• Juba’s political elite faces internal SPLM divisions and economic crisis.

During his 16 October visit, Under-Secretary-General Jean-Pierre Lacroix acknowledged that UNISFA operates under severe liquidity constraints, forcing it to scale down logistics, mobility, and air operations. Civil society leaders described the mission as “the last line of protection” in Abyei — a phrase now echoing across local communities reliant on the mission for basic security.

Strategic and Political Issues for the Council

Mandate Renewal Options:

1. Status Quo Extension (12 months): Maintain UNISFA and JBVMM under existing terms.

2. Adaptive Mandate: Adjust priorities to emphasize protection of civilians, Amiet market stabilization, and enhanced political mediation.

3. Mandate Recalibration: Reduce troop levels and focus on border monitoring and humanitarian corridors, acknowledging fiscal and operational limits.

Core Challenges:

• Armed Actor Presence: RSF and SSPDF forces continue to violate Abyei’s demilitarized status.
• Freedom of Movement: Recurrent restrictions by both Sudanese and South Sudanese elements.
• Political Vacuum: Lack of dialogue undercuts any progress toward final status negotiations.
• Operational Strain: Supply chain disruptions, absence of police units, and funding shortfalls undermine mandate delivery.

Council Dynamics and External Frictions

UNISFA’s mandate renewals have traditionally passed by consensus, except the 2024 renewal, when Russia abstained, arguing that references to Sudan’s civil war were “beyond mandate scope.”

Current positions reflect broader geopolitical divisions:

• The U.S. prioritizes civilian protection and operational flexibility, though its budgetary retrenchment may temper support for expansion.
• Russia and China oppose what they term “mission overreach,” viewing the Abyei file through the prism of sovereignty and non-interference.
• African members, notably Mozambique and Sierra Leone, advocate sustained presence given Abyei’s humanitarian fragility.

The U.N. liquidity crisis adds complexity, with limited funding jeopardizing rotations, fuel supply, and humanitarian escort operations.

African Security Analysis (ASA) Strategic Assessment

UNISFA faces an existential paradox: it is indispensable but unsustainable. The mission has successfully prevented large-scale conflict in Abyei for over a decade, yet the dual militarization by RSF and SSPDF now erodes its neutrality and limits its deterrent capacity.

ASA assesses that:

• The Abyei dispute risks evolving into a proxy frontier between Sudan’s fractured military and South Sudanese factions.
• The absence of political leadership in both states ensures continued stalemate, leaving the mission as a holding instrument, not a peace-making tool.
• The UN liquidity crisis could compel downsizing or reduced patrol coverage, exposing civilians and trade corridors to greater risk.
• Without deployment of formed police units and a civilian deputy, UNISFA’s mandate remains operationally incomplete.

Outlook (Q1–Q2 2026)

• Short-term: Mandate renewal likely for 12 months; no progress on final status talks.
• Medium-term: Rising RSF entrenchment and criminal networks along northern Abyei; further degradation of JBVMM functionality.
• Long-term: Abyei’s limbo status solidifies into a de facto partitioned zone, managed through international containment rather than resolution.

ASA Conclusion:

Abyei remains the epicentre of inertia between two fragile states — hostage to Sudan’s internal war and South Sudan’s governance paralysis. UNISFA endures as a containment mechanism, not a catalyst for resolution.
Absent decisive political re-engagement or mandate adaptation, the mission risks sliding from stabilizer to bystander, sustaining a fragile calm in a region where both peace and statehood remain indefinitely postponed.