The DRC and the Kigali-Kampala Axis: Navigating Strategic Challenges and Structural Imbalances

Editorial Analysis by Africa Security Analysis

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) risks making a strategic error by directly engaging in the complex and informal relationship between Uganda and Rwanda. This relationship isn't built on formal treaties, trade agreements, or institutional alignment. Instead, it is shaped by historical ties, informal wartime alliances, shared security concerns, and personal connections — a mix of emotional and often unclear relationships that go beyond traditional diplomacy.

Africa Security Analysis (ASA) argues that the Rwanda-Uganda dynamic operates outside the usual statecraft structures. It runs through informal channels, with both countries managing their mutual interests through a strategy of controlled rivalry and regional balance. In this arrangement, the instability in eastern Congo has effectively become a buffer zone and a flexible element in their foreign policies.

When Kinshasa directly engages in this relationship, without strategic planning or diplomatic frameworks in place, it weakens its own position. Unstructured contacts risk diminishing the DRC's strategic stance, undermining its sovereignty, and leaving its leadership vulnerable to being manipulated in foreign narratives.

To maintain its independence, the DRC needs to refocus on formal engagement mechanisms. Diplomatic missions, discreet channels, and professional intermediaries are essential for maintaining a balanced distance while preserving state authority. ASA notes that bypassing these formal processes exposes the DRC to power imbalances it is ill-equipped to handle.

Moreover, the DRC should not confuse personal relationships with political influence. Assuming that strong ties to regional leaders automatically equate to political leverage can lead to strategic errors. In these environments, real power often lies with lesser-known, more discreet figures. Building relationships with these individuals requires deep institutional knowledge and a long-term diplomatic approach, not just short-term personal connections.

The DRC’s public focus on Presidents Paul Kagame of Rwanda and Yoweri Museveni of Uganda—often framed through the idea of a “Balkanization plan”—distracts from more urgent internal issues. ASA stresses that this narrative, while politically convenient, lacks solid analytical foundation. It deflects attention from the true problem: the DRC’s political fragmentation, which is mainly internal and structural.

The decline in central authority has been driven by the rise of local actors—provincial elites, armed groups, and informal networks—who control resources, legitimacy, and territory. In some regions, these actors already function as proto-state authorities. Over time, their growing power could further fragment the country, especially in areas suffering prolonged instability.

This chronic instability serves a strategic purpose. As ASA points out, the status quo benefits all three capitals involved. Kinshasa, Kigali, and Kampala each gain political or strategic value from the ongoing instability. Kinshasa exchanges sovereignty for political benefits, while Kigali and Kampala exploit the power vacuum to extend their influence without the responsibility of direct governance. ASA argues that none of these players currently seeks the emergence of a stable, sovereign, and competitive Congolese state on its borders.

The idea of full territorial annexation remains unlikely. No responsible government would risk the demographic and political challenges such a move would create. Instead, the preferred approach is indirect control—accessing Congolese resources through proxy structures, under the guise of ongoing instability, and without the need for administrative oversight.

Similarly, the notion that the DRC could be a base for exiled political movements or armed returnees is unrealistic. Kinshasa lacks the logistical capacity and strategic will to support such efforts. The so-called Wazalendo coalition is not a unified political platform but a loose collection of fragmented groups without a clear agenda, reliable supply chains, or strong regional alliances.

Conclusion

The current regional dynamics are shaped by a mix of informal alliances, strategic ambiguity, and managed instability. The DRC’s efforts to assert influence in this environment—especially by engaging directly with Rwanda and Uganda—expose it to asymmetrical relationships driven more by personal networks and informal connections than by formal diplomacy or binding agreements.

The continued weakening of central authority in the DRC opens up space for local actors and informal systems to gain influence, especially in areas with little or contested state presence. This internal fragmentation coincides with a regional situation where the instability in eastern Congo benefits multiple external actors. For these players, maintaining a grey zone—neither fully stable nor completely chaotic—seems strategically advantageous.

Attempts to navigate this landscape without clear institutional mechanisms, strategic safeguards, or communication frameworks tend to undermine the DRC’s position. In contrast, using formal diplomacy, multilateral engagement, and discreet intermediaries offers a stronger foundation for maintaining state neutrality, protecting sovereignty, and minimizing exposure to informal control.

ASA experts note that, at present, there is no clear evidence of any regional power pushing for drastic border changes or direct annexation. The preferred strategy seems to be indirect control, accessing resources without accountability, and maintaining long-term influence through fragmented or dependent actors. Meanwhile, the use of armed groups or political narratives within the DRC does not appear to form a coherent, viable strategy with regional support or long-term prospects.

Ultimately, the regional system shows that instability is not just a result of weakness, but a condition that is managed and sometimes leveraged. Any analysis of the DRC’s regional positioning must consider both the internal dynamics of state fragmentation and the external incentives that sustain the current status quo.