When
Location
Topic
3 juni 2025 18:25
Uganda
Civil Security, Armed groups, Counter-Terrorism, Maintaining order
Stamp

Familial Ties and the Rise of Second-Generation Jihad in Kampala

Overview

On the morning of June 3, 2025, Ugandan security forces intercepted a man and a woman riding a motorcycle near the Munyonyo Martyrs’ Shrine in Kampala. As soldiers closed in, the woman detonated an explosive device, taking both her own life and that of her male counterpart. Investigations quickly revealed that she was the daughter of one of the suicide bombers responsible for the November 2021 attack on Kampala’s Central Police Station (CPS). This incident confirms earlier warnings from Africa Security Analysis, which had foreseen a troubling trend: extremist groups in Uganda were increasingly exploiting familial networks to recruit second-generation jihadists. This development underscores the evolving tactics of domestic terrorist cells and highlights the enduring vulnerability of high-profile religious sites in the capital.

Historical Context and Familial Connections

1. The November 2021 CPS Attacks in November 2021, three suicide bombers attacked Kampala’s Central Police Station, killing two police officers and one civilian, and later detonated near Parliament, causing additional casualties among bystanders. The Islamic State (IS), operating through its local Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) affiliate, claimed responsibility. The bombers had infiltrated under the guise of radicalized youth networks spanning Kampala and eastern DRC, with several sleeper cells identified as early as the summer of 2021, though they were not neutralized in time.

2. The Munyonyo Bomber’s Lineage A month before the June 2025 attack, Africa Security Analysis had issued a confidential warning that the ADF was grooming children of imprisoned terrorists to carry out retaliatory strikes. This warning proved prophetic when it was established that the woman involved in the Munyonyo incident was the daughter of one of the 2021 CPS attackers—a stark reminder of how extremist groups are now weaponizing familial loyalty to perpetuate their violent agenda.

Early Warning and Intelligence Gaps

1. Africa Security Analysis sounded the alarm in May 2025 warning that families might be targeted to serve as “clandestine operatives” for high-profile attacks, particularly during significant religious events.

2. Vulnerable Targets and Timing Experts had pinpointed the Munyonyo Martyrs’ Shrine as a prime target due to its annual commemorative mass, which attracts thousands—including notable political and religious leaders. The intended impact was clear: a targeted attack at such a venue would maximize media exposure while instilling widespread fear, especially among communities that had been less frequently targeted in previous operations.

The Attack on June 3, 2025

1. Incident Details At dawn on June 3, just after the start of the annual mass at the Munyonyo Shrine, armed patrols spotted the duo approaching on a motorcycle. Thanks to prior intelligence alerts, security forces were already on stand-by. As soldiers attempted to intercept them at an improvised checkpoint, the female operative triggered her explosive device. The resulting blast claimed both lives and left two nearby guards with minor injuries. Despite the large gathering of worshippers and tourists, the swift response limited the loss of life.

2. Identification and Familial Connection Investigators swiftly linked the bomber to her familial ties, confirming her identity as the daughter of the 2021 attacker—an individual who had been released on bail in 2024. She had even made a public declaration in early 2025 through ADF propaganda videos, affirming her commitment to continue her family’s “path of jihad.” Encrypted communications with operatives near the DRC–Uganda border bolstered the evidence of her planned coordination with sleeper cells.

Analysis of Security Vulnerabilities and Strategic Shifts

1. Surveillance Shortcomings Notwithstanding the May warning, critical gaps in surveillance, such as the absence of drones over the shrine and limited motorcycle patrols confined to main roads, allowed the attackers to close in undetected. This oversight starkly highlights vulnerabilities in Uganda’s security apparatus, even amidst recent heightened alertness in Kampala.

2. Tactical Exploitation of Familial Ties The deliberate use of a family member in this attack underscores a calculated shift by the ADF. Previously, measures such as releasing prisoners to ease overcrowding inadvertently enabled radicalism to fester within these communities. By leveraging these “legitimate” familial relationships, the ADF managed to conceal its recruits until the critical moment of attack, complicating prevention measures.

Immediate Aftermath and Counter-Radicalization Measures

In response to the incident, authorities swiftly tightened security around key religious sites. A mobile protection perimeter was established around the Munyonyo Shrine and bomb-disposal teams along with continuous aerial surveillance were deployed. Additionally, President Museveni commissioned a joint task force comprising intelligence, police, and military units to dismantle the extensive financial and logistical networks underpinning the attack. Church leaders also issued calls for calm and heightened community vigilance, reaffirming their commitment to safeguarding sacred spaces.

Conclusion

The Munyonyo attack of June 3, 2025—executed by the daughter of a 2021 suicide bomber—vividly illustrates the dangerous evolution of the ADF’s tactics. The incident reflects a shift towards exploiting hereditary loyalty within extremist families to fuel urban terrorism in Uganda. While intelligence agencies responded rapidly upon uncovering the bomber’s familial connection, the oversight in detecting these emergent “weak signals” in familial radicalization reveals significant gaps in current counter-terrorism strategies. As jihadist groups increasingly embrace a “heritage-based insurgency,” the imperative for robust community-level intelligence and pre-emptive measures has never been clearer.


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