How ADF/ISCAP Overran Komanda in July 2025

Summary

This article offers a deeply detailed analysis of the ADF/ISCAP's (Allied Democratic Forces/Islamic State Central Africa Province) operations in Komanda, a town in the Ituri province of the Democratic Republic of Congo. The article provides a comprehensive breakdown of the attack, from the group's infiltration strategy to the tactical execution and broader strategic goals. It also addresses the local and regional security dynamics, offering recommendations to improve local defence measures and prevent future incidents.

The Komanda attack by ADF/ISCAP

At the end of July 2025, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF), operating under the Islamic State banner as ISCAP, carried out one of the deadliest raids in recent years on the town of Komanda in Ituri. The attack—preceded by a three-week infiltration manoeuvre tracked in real time by African Security Analysis (ASA)—left at least forty-one confirmed civilians dead, dozens more wounded, and temporarily paralyzed Komanda’s main commercial hub. Despite two explicit ASA “red-flag” warnings in July, local security forces failed to erect an effective shield. The incident highlights persistent weaknesses in alert transmission, route security, and civil–military coordination which, if left uncorrected, will continue to grant ADF/ISCAP freedom of action along the Ituri–North Kivu seam.

General Context

Pressure from joint FARDC–UPDF operations in North Kivu at the end of 2024 fragmented ADF/ISCAP into highly mobile micro-columns. Several of these units slipped into Ituri, skirting the Babila-Babombi chiefdom and seeking vulnerable targets along the critical Bunia–Beni and Bunia–Kisangani corridors. Straddling both roads, Komanda became the insurgents’ new front line. ASA analysts observed that in July 2025 the group pursued three complementary objectives: restocking supplies, inflicting sectarian terror, and creating a diversion to facilitate deeper leadership movements into the Irumu forest.

July Manoeuvre Chronology

Phase I – Consolidation and Southward Drift (6–20 July)
Immediately after FARDC–UPDF air and ground strikes destroyed several camps in the Pakango–Subi–Mukasia triangle, an ADF emir ordered a tactical withdrawal. A column of about forty-to-fifty armed men and nearly 120 dependants—women, children, porters and elderly—moved south, traveling by night and hiding in banana groves by day to mask their numbers. ASA’s first alert was in July when reports of the convoy’s passage from Pakango toward Mungamba and identified Byakato, Beu-Manyama and Komanda as probable objectives.

Phase II – Contact near the Ituri River (25 July)
At 14:30 on 25 July ASA field agents observed a column on the Bulembi-Manate-Kartum ridge, roughly five kilometres north of the Ituri River, in Komanda’s approach corridor. A second “red-flag” cable urged FARDC commanders to establish a forward screen; none was set up.

Phase III – Diversion and Offensive (26–28 July)
At dusk on 26 July the vanguard reached Komanda’s western outskirts. At 23:50 two fighters deliberately fired near the local market, drawing patrols west and opening the eastern flank. Moments later the main force infiltrated the Sainte-Bienheureuse-Anuarite parish compound, where an overnight Catholic vigil was under way. Killings began with machetes to delay alarm; only after panic spread did the attackers fire brief bursts to cover looting of nearby shops. Paraffin-soaked sacks set three stores and a freight truck ablaze, providing enough light to round up teenage hostages before melting east onto Mont Hoyo trails.

Tactical Analysis

The Komanda raid typifies the ADF/ISCAP operating method refined since 2023. Fighters embed among civilian relatives posing as itinerant farmers or traders, burying weapons in latrines until ordered to strike. Reconnaissance prioritizes religious sites, which offer psychological leverage and predictable crowds. Diversionary gunfire or small brush fires routinely mislead security forces seconds before the main assault. Post-attack withdrawal is radial: looting squads fan out to seize food, fuel, cash and cacao, then regroup on forest trails where captives can be marched silently. The pattern underscores the group’s dual dependence on terror for recruitment propaganda and plunder for day-to-day survival.

Strategic Implications

On July 28, the same rebel column decapitated two motorcycle taxi drivers in Sokotano, 12 km from Komanda, creating a diversion while elements of the command that led the operation were repositioning for their next actions. The killing aimed to pin FARDC reaction units while the main column crossed the Ituri River.

ADF/ISCAP leader Musa Baluku is believed to remain entrenched in the vast forest belt of Irumu. According to available information, he is reportedly awaiting the arrival of a doctor coming from abroad; the diversionary attacks (Komanda, Sokotano) are intended to pull security forces away to allow the doctor to move through the Eringeti axis.

This macabre act of July 28 was aimed at spreading terror and diverting government forces’ attention in order to free the Oicha–Eringeti axis and facilitate the passage of Musa Baluku’s attending physician.

The dormant cells of the ADF/ISCAP are planning a large-scale terrorist attack into urban centres as far as Kinshasa.

Reliable intelligence collected by African Security Analysis (ASA) shows that dormant ADF/ISCAP cells are gearing up for fresh sectarian attacks on Christian congregations in Ituri and North Kivu, with the threat potentially stretching into urban centres as far as Kinshasa because the ADF/ISCAP intends to reaffirm its allegiance to ISIS central.

The freed recruitment networks continue to maintain contact with those seeking to strengthen ties between the ADF/ISCAP in Central Africa and the Central Islamic State.

Independent Recommendations

To prevent a similar tragedy, African Security Analysis (ASA) proposes five inter-locking measures.

First, neighbourhood vigilance. Every at-risk village must have an alert committee trained to spot suspicious movement and equipped with simple communications (HF radios, satellite phones). These community relays must be able to trigger a FARDC-police-UPDF response chain in under 30 minutes. ASA can deliver rapid early-warning training for local leaders.

Second, security net along economic routes. Mobile patrols and random checkpoints should cover the Komanda-Bunia and Komanda-Oïcha roads, giving priority escorts to cacao, fuel and food convoys to deny the ADF logistical loot.

Third, focused protection of places of worship. A visible armed presence is required around churches; night vigils should, if necessary, shift to daylight hours while the threat remains high. Perimeter lighting and controlled entry points must become standard.

Fourth, civil–military coordination. Mixed committees—territorial administrators, customary chiefs, religious leaders, local FARDC commanders—must meet weekly to share intelligence, plan escorts and impose ad-hoc curfews.

Fifth, restoring state authority. Vacant customary posts must be filled promptly, and each high-risk chiefdom given a permanent administrative focal point to speed information flow and oversee contingency plans.

A cross-cutting priority is rebuilding trust between the population and the army. The sector commander’s public outburst blaming “certain sons of Komanda” for aiding the rebels may erode that trust and deter locals from cooperating. FARDC should therefore pair any hunt for proven accomplices with outreach: joint foot patrols with local leaders, listening meetings in parishes, and radio messages stressing that security is a shared effort, not a relationship of suspicion. Inclusive communication, coupled with the technical measures above, will provide citizens tangible reasons to cooperate and give the army the human intelligence it needs to spot future infiltrations.

Conclusion

The Komanda massacre proves that ADF/ISCAP retains both the will and the capacity to pair stealthy infiltration with high-impact sectarian violence whenever security gaps arise. African Security Analysis (ASA) reports published in July could have prevented or mitigated the tragedy had decisive measures followed. Closing the alert-to-response gap is now the top priority for Ituri’s civil and military authorities.

Breaking this cycle means:

• Agile mobile security patrols that can respond the moment a threat emerges.
• Strong, resilient partnerships with communities who know the terrain and the people
• Targeted disruption of the fixer-finance networks that stretch from urban jails to forest hideouts

Over the coming month, success will be measured by three indicators:

1. Preventing new insurgent footholds in key transit villages.

2. Constricting insurgent manoeuvre space through route dominance.

3. Visibly protecting Christian gatherings to blunt ISCAP’s narrative.

ASA is there, ready to assist

At ASA, we’re on watch around the clock—tracking movements, intercepting chatter, and feeding rapid intelligence updates. Now it’s up to field commanders and their civilian partners to turn those signals into real protection on the ground. Our early-July alerts prove the warning signs were clear; missing them again could let insurgents strike farther afield—maybe even in Kinshasa.