Great Lakes Crossroads: Tshisekedi’s Calculated Diplomacy and the Shifting Power Geometry in the DRC–Rwanda Crisis

Overview: From Diplomacy to Pre-emptive Justification

The Great Lakes region stands at another inflection point. In the same week, two developments exposed the fragility of the regional order: the announcement of a sixth round of negotiations between the Congolese government and the AFC–M23 coalition, and President Félix Tshisekedi’s public call in Brussels for “peace among the brave,” addressed to Rwandan President Paul Kagame.
While these gestures signal renewed dialogue, African Security Analysis (ASA) judges that Tshisekedi’s posture also serves to consolidate international legitimacy and pre-position blame should conditions deteriorate.

Renewed Talks: The Sixth Round of the Luanda Process

According to official channels, the sixth round between Kinshasa and AFC–M23 will convene next week under Angolan–Kenyan facilitation within the Luanda Process. The agenda includes ceasefire enforcement, disarmament, refugee returns, and control of illicit mining corridors along the Bunagana–Rutshuru–Goma axis.
Yet the ground picture remains volatile: fighting persists in North Kivu and Ituri, with reports of M23 gains near Kiwanja and Sake. MONUSCO and SADC sources cite continued artillery fire, large-scale displacement, and signs of coordinated rebel manoeuvre—indicating retained depth and external enablers.

Tshisekedi’s Brussels Appeal: Public Stage, Private Intent

On 9 October 2025 at the Global Gateway Forum in Brussels, Tshisekedi appealed directly to Kagame: “We are the only two capable of stopping this escalation… I extend my hand, Mr President, for us to make peace among the brave.” He urged Kigali to halt M23 operations, accusing Rwanda of sustaining the group militarily. Invoking Angolan President João Lourenço, he argued that Rwanda’s earlier boycott derailed a deal “98% complete”.
For Kinshasa, the message was simple: Rwanda is the obstacle. For Brussels, it was a plea for solidarity. For Kigali, a provocation—met by an immediate riposte from Rwanda’s foreign minister and a dismissive post from Kagame on X.

A Broader Context: Political Shockwaves in Kinshasa

The Brussels appeal followed two politically charged moves inside the DRC:

1. The death sentence (in absentia) for former president Joseph Kabila over alleged collusion with armed movements including AFC–M23; and

2. Tshisekedi’s refusal to sign a US-backed regional security framework without Rwanda’s immediate withdrawal of troops and intelligence operatives.
Internationally, these steps read as symbolic but tactical; domestically, they reinforce Tshisekedi’s sovereignty credentials. ASA assesses that, together with the Brussels “hand of peace,” they are calibrated to pre-empt political responsibility if the east deteriorates.

The Luanda–Nairobi Paradox: Talks Without Trust

Institutionally robust but politically thin, the Luanda and Nairobi tracks suffer from a collapse of trust. Kinshasa frames the war as external aggression; Kigali frames its moves as self-defence against hostile Congolese proxies. On the ground, AFC–M23 couples military pressure with territorial control to secure taxation and trade routes. Absent credible verification and reciprocal confidence measures, the next round risks theatre that buys time rather than peace.

Regional and Global Implications

The Red Sea and East African corridors have become strategic competition zones. Angola’s AU role, Kenya’s mediation ambitions, Uganda’s cross-border equities, and Rwanda’s military reach intersect with renewed EU engagement via the Global Gateway—yet Europe’s leverage is constrained as China, Russia, and Gulf states deepen security and investment ties.

Optics Over Outreach

The synchronised timing of Tshisekedi’s Brussels appeal and the sixth negotiation round looks designed, not coincidental. These moves function more as position-setting than reconciliation: consolidating external backing and creating a paper trail of willingness to engage. Framed by firm preconditions—Rwandan withdrawal and full M23 demobilisation—Tshisekedi casts Kinshasa as the reasonable actor. The same staging serves a domestic purpose: insulating his government if the battlefield turns and shifting accountability towards Kigali and limited third-party leverage. ASA therefore reads the gesture as primarily strategic—narrative management aimed at Western partners and the home front as the balance on the ground evolves.

Strategic Outlook and Advisory Note

In the coming weeks, diplomatic overtures will either harden into fragile stabilisation or collapse into renewed interstate and proxy confrontation. The DRC–Rwanda standoff is now a multidimensional security dilemma, where domestic legitimacy, cross-border intelligence activity, and calibrated signalling interact within an increasingly contested regional architecture.

ASA Strategic Assessment

ASA assesses a transition from open confrontation to competitive statecraft—reliant on hybrid instruments: disinformation, calibrated escalation, and economic coercion.

Three interdependent axes sustain the region’s equilibrium:

1. Military posture and deterrence signals. Track redeployments and fires in North Kivu and Ituri ahead of Nairobi VI; focus on changes along the Goma–Bunagana–Rutshuru arc.

2. Narrative warfare. Kinshasa and Kigali are running coordinated information operations (IOs) to shape international perception and mediation outcomes; monitor alignment across state media, official X accounts, and diplomatic briefs.

3. Institutional fatigue. The Luanda Process shows declining deterrent credibility as Angola’s enforcement bandwidth and SADC’s limited force projection strain the mechanism.

At the strategic level, US engagement is increasingly conditional, adding uncertainty. If Kinshasa leverages the US-backed security compact mainly for domestic optics, American leverage may erode—opening space for Russia, China, and Gulf actors to expand security and investment footprints in the Great Lakes corridor.

ASA Advisory Priorities

• Force mobility and logistics corridors: ISR on redeployments along the Goma–Bunagana axis; indicators include new forward sites, artillery displacement, and airlift surges.
• Cross-border illicit economy flows: Mineral-taxation nodes, trader coercion, and arms-procurement routes sustaining non-state proxies.
• Information and influence ecosystems: Synchronisation between domestic outlets, diaspora channels, and embassy messaging; spikes in bot-like amplification and coordinated hashtag campaigns.
• Mediation resilience metrics: Attendance and compliance at Luanda/Nairobi milestones, verification gaps, and time-to-remedy—quantified to gauge remaining elasticity before institutional breakdown.

ASA Support Offerings

ASA provides classified, costed analytical briefings integrating multi-domain situational awareness, early-warning modelling, and decision-support frameworks for:
• Detection of political manipulation within peace processes;
• Mapping and forecasting cross-border logistics and mineral-route control;
• Assessment of strategic-communications vulnerabilities in Great Lakes diplomacy and external partnerships.
Custom real-time intelligence dashboards, geospatial conflict trackers, and policy-grade risk briefs are available to institutional partners, investors, peacekeeping planners, and government entities operating in the DRC–Rwanda–Uganda axis. For specialised consultations or operational integration, contact ASA confidentially.