Great Lakes Security Forecast – October 2025: Risks, Mediation Dynamics, and Strategic Options

Executive Summary

• Council focus (October): Biannual briefing by Huang Xia on implementation of the 2013 Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (PSC-F) and regional de-escalation.
• Trendline: Diplomatic tracks multiplied (US/Qatar/EAC-SADC-AU), but security conditions deteriorated in North and South Kivu; mass-casualty ADF attacks and renewed M23 activity reported.
• Inflection points to watch: Joint Security Coordination Mechanism roll-out; prisoner-exchange mechanism via ICRC; consolidation of EAC-SADC-AU mediation; funding and mandate alignment across regional initiatives.

Expected Council Action

In October, the Council is expected to receive the biannual briefing from the Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, Huang Xia, on the implementation of the 2013 PSC-F for the DRC and the Great Lakes region.

Background and Key Recent Developments

Bilateral De-escalation: DRC–Rwanda

• 27 June (Washington): DRC and Rwanda signed a peace agreement under US auspices following mutual accusations of supporting proxy armed groups in eastern DRC.
• 30 July–1 August (Washington): Follow-on meetings to operationalise security elements of the agreement.
• 31 July: First session of the Joint Oversight Committee established by the agreement, with participation from Qatar, Togo (AU facilitator), US, and AU Commission.
• 1 August: Initialling of a Regional Economic Integration Framework linked to the 27 June accord.

Joint Security Architecture

• 7–8 August (Addis Ababa): First meeting of the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism to oversee the concept of operations for:

– Neutralisation of the FDLR, and

– Sequenced disengagement/lifting of defensive measures by Rwanda, per the 27 June agreement.
Terms of reference adopted; Qatar, US, AU mediator’s representative, and AU Commission attended.

Track with M23 (Qatar-Facilitated)

• April (Doha): Initial direct meeting produced a 23 April joint declaration (cessation of hostilities; rejection of hate speech/intimidation).
• 18 August: Target date for a separate draft peace agreement (DRC–M23) slipped amid disputes over sequencing and confidence-building measures (e.g., release of POWs).
• Update: Parties reportedly agreed to establish an ICRC-facilitated Prisoner Exchange Mechanism (identification, verification, safe release).

Mediation Consolidation (EAC–SADC–AU)

• 1 August (Nairobi): EAC and SADC Chairs (Presidents Ruto and Mnangagwa) met the joint Panel of Facilitators; outcome—merge EAC-SADC efforts with AU mediation and encourage other initiatives to align with a consolidated African-led process.
• 13 August: EAC-SADC extraordinary summit endorsed the consolidation.
• 17 August (Antananarivo): SADC annual summit welcomed consolidation; urged complementarity with Qatar and US tracks.

Security Deterioration on the Ground

• 22 August: Security Council held an emergency session condemning the upsurge of armed group attacks, including by M23 and others.
• Early September (North Kivu): Multiple ADF attacks reportedly killed 89 civilians.
• South Kivu: Tensions rising around Uvira (Lake Tanganyika border area).

Human Rights–Related Developments

• 5 September: UN Human Rights Office Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) on North and South Kivu reported serious violations of IHL by all parties—M23 (supported by RDF), FARDC, and affiliated militias (Wazalendo).
• Documented abuses include:

– Attacks on protected sites (schools, hospitals), summary executions, torture, enforced disappearances, forced recruitment.

– Systematic conflict-related sexual violence (including rape and sexual slavery) targeting women, girls, men, boys, and LGBT persons.

– Child recruitment and arbitrary detention.

– Violations by FARDC/Wazalendo during retreats in early 2025 (killings, looting, widespread CRSV).

Key Issues for the Council

1. Stabilising Eastern DRC: Reversing the deterioration in North/South Kivu and reducing cross-border escalatory dynamics, notably around Uvira.

2. De-conflicting Mediation Tracks: Ensuring coordination and primacy of the consolidated African-led process (EAC–SADC–AU) while integrating US/Qatar facilitation and maintaining coherence with the 27 June DRC–Rwanda accord.

3. Operationalising Security Mechanisms:

• Making the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism fully functional.
• Advancing FDLR neutralisation and sequenced disengagement measures.
• Standing up the ICRC-facilitated prisoner exchange with verifiable safeguards.

4. Revitalising the PSC-F: Translating the Entebbe (28 May) R-O-M action plan and independent assessment into time-bound commitments that address root causes (governance, security sector reform, community protection, resource governance).

5. Protection of Civilians & Accountability: Responding to FFM findings with credible accountability pathways, survivor-centred CRSV services, and child protection measures.

6. Illicit Economies & Critical Minerals: Reducing resource-driven insecurity through due diligence, traceability, and anti-smuggling cooperation across the Great Lakes.

Options for the Council

• Product Options

– Press Statement welcoming outcomes of the Entebbe R-O-M (28 May), urging rapid implementation of the action plan and support from regional partners.

– Elements to the Press condemning recent attacks (including by ADF and M23) and urging compliance with IHL and human rights law.

– Informal Interactive Dialogue (IID) with EAC–SADC–AU facilitators, ICRC, and key donors on synchronising tracks and resourcing civilian protection.

• Substantive Steps

– Encourage joint benchmarks for the DRC–Rwanda 27 June accord (ceasefire compliance, disengagement, monitoring, DDRR).

– Support immediate operationalisation of the prisoner-exchange mechanism under ICRC with transparent verification and do-no-harm protocols.

– Request a short, fused update from Huang Xia on mediation alignment and the Joint Security Coordination Mechanism’s next milestones (30/60/90-day horizon).

– Invite the Sanctions Committee (1533 DRC) to brief on measures against spoilers and those benefiting from illegal resource exploitation.

Council and Wider Dynamics

• Many members welcome progress on mediation and de-escalation but remain split on attribution language. A French-proposed press statement reportedly stalled over a US push to cite “Rwanda-backed M23,” opposed by the A3 Plus (Algeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Guyana).
• There is shared concern over the worsening humanitarian and human rights context, especially CRSV and child protection, with accountability gaining traction as violence resurges.
• Resource governance stays on the agenda. Sierra Leone’s July Arria-formula meeting spotlighted critical minerals competition in the DRC/Great Lakes; US interest in diversified supply chains intersects with broader geopolitical dynamics.

Outlook (October–December 2025)

• Best-case: Consolidated African-led mediation establishes synchronized benchmarks; localised ceasefire holds; prisoner exchanges begin; ADF operational tempo reduced via targeted regional cooperation; humanitarian access improves.
• Baseline: Mixed progress—mechanisms launch but face delays; intermittent clashes continue; protection risks persist; mediation tracks require continuous de-confliction.
• Risk case: Breakdown in coordination; escalatory incidents near Uvira/Goma; increased civilian harm; confidence in diplomatic tracks erodes.

African Security Analysis (ASA) Recommendations (Actionable)

Back the Coordinated Mediation Track: Publicly recognise the EAC–SADC–AU convergence; invite facilitators to brief the Council within 30 days.

Protect Civilians Now: Scale mobile protection and survivor-centred CRSV services; deploy child-protection advisers where needs are acute.

Stand Up the ICRC Mechanism: Encourage start-of-process simultaneous verified releases to build momentum and trust.

Resource Governance: Urge states and companies to apply OECD due-diligence and support regional traceability schemes; target sanctions on armed-group financing nodes.

Metrics and Transparency: Request monthly situational updates from the Special Envoy keyed to benchmarks (ceasefire incidents, civilian harm, DDRR progress, justice actions).

Strategic Note

This report underscores the complexity of overlapping mediation tracks, armed group dynamics, and the economic drivers of instability in the Great Lakes. Managing these interlocking pressures requires more than routine updates: it demands granular intelligence, scenario-based forecasting, and policy-to-field translation that can guide choices before crises harden into protracted conflict.

ASA’s work consistently bridges this gap. By combining diplomatic signal analysis, armed-group behavioural mapping, and resource-market monitoring, ASA equips decision-makers to anticipate inflection points and act with foresight. While this forecast provides a structured overview, ASA maintains the capacity to deliver deeper confidential assessments—whether for governments shaping mediation strategies, multilateral bodies coordinating peace operations, or investors navigating resource-driven insecurity.

Such advanced assessments and scenario planning require dedicated costed engagements. Decision-makers interested in securing tailored analysis, risk modelling, or confidential advisory should directly contact ASA.

ASA remains available to ensure that responses to the Great Lakes’ evolving challenges are proactive, coherent, and sustainable