Sudan at the Threshold of Irreversibility

Monthly Situational Analysis & Strategic Warning

Executive Analytical Overview

Sudan is entering a new phase of strategic fragmentation, marked by intensified multi-front military operations, deepening humanitarian collapse, and the hardening of political positions among domestic and international stakeholders. The conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) is no longer a contest for short-term leverage but has evolved into a protracted war of territorial consolidation, population control, and external alignment. The absence of a credible ceasefire framework, combined with the systematic erosion of civilian protection norms, signals a high probability of continued escalation rather than de-escalation in the coming months.

The situation presents a compound risk environment: military escalation, mass atrocity recurrence, regional spillover, and the progressive hollowing-out of state authority. From an ASA perspective, Sudan now meets multiple indicators of entrenched conflict normalization, where violence becomes the default governance mechanism in contested zones.

Political and Diplomatic Context: Security Council Engagement under Constraint

In February, the UN Security Council is expected to receive its regular 120-day briefing on Sudan. The United Kingdom, holding the rotating presidency, has indicated its intention to elevate the briefing to ministerial level, a move that reflects both the gravity of the crisis and the lack of meaningful progress toward resolution.

However, institutional friction within the Council remains evident. The Sudan 1591 Sanctions Committee has yet to function fully due to delays in appointing a Chair, exposing procedural paralysis at a moment when enforcement credibility is urgently needed. The UK’s proposal to substitute a formal briefing with a written statement highlights the disconnect between bureaucratic process and operational urgency.

This diplomatic inertia reinforces a broader pattern: while concern is widely shared, collective action remains constrained by geopolitical divergence, limiting the Council’s ability to exert decisive influence over conflict dynamics on the ground.

Military Situation: Escalation, Territorial Contestation, and Strategic Axes

The military situation continues to deteriorate across multiple theaters. Both SAF and RSF have intensified operations aimed at consolidating control over strategic corridors, urban centers, and resource-linked zones. Ground offensives, heavy artillery, drone strikes, and aerial bombardments are increasingly employed in densely populated areas, accelerating civilian harm.

The Kordofan region has emerged as a principal epicenter of hostilities. Fighting in South Kordofan—particularly around Dilling and Kadugli—has combined siege tactics with maneuver warfare, producing acute humanitarian distress. Reports that SAF and allied forces re-entered Dilling on 26 January, breaking an RSF siege of nearly two years and reopening the eastern supply route to North Kordofan, mark a tactical gain but not a strategic turning point. The reopening of supply lines stabilizes SAF’s local position but does not fundamentally alter the broader balance of power.

Elsewhere, North Darfur remains highly volatile following the RSF’s takeover of El Fasher in late October. The city’s fall represents a qualitative shift: it signals RSF’s capacity to seize and hold major urban centers while neutralizing international access. In Blue Nile State, renewed mobilization by armed groups in southern and western areas raises serious concerns of spillover toward Ethiopia and South Sudan, transforming localized clashes into a potential regional security fault line.

Humanitarian Situation: Systemic Collapse and Mass Atrocity Risk

The humanitarian situation has reached catastrophic levels. The UN’s first assessment mission to El Fasher since its siege began in May 2024 revealed a city described by the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator as a “crime scene”, with indications that thousands may have been killed. Civilian testimony and site visits—including to the Saudi Hospital—suggest systematic violence, including massacres during RSF operations in October.

Limited humanitarian access has marginally improved with the delivery of aid in January, but these efforts remain episodic and insufficient. Famine conditions have been confirmed in Kadugli, with Dilling and other areas at high risk. Displacement continues at scale, overwhelming host communities and eroding coping mechanisms.

From an ASA warning perspective, Sudan exhibits repeat-atrocity risk patterns: siege warfare, dehumanization narratives, impunity, and population displacement along ethnic and political lines. Without structural intervention, mass violence is likely to recur, particularly in Kordofan and Darfur.

Human Rights and Protection of Civilians

The visit of UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk underscored the severity of the crisis. His characterization of Sudan’s descent into an “abyss of unfathomable proportions” reflects not rhetorical excess but empirical observation. Attacks against civilian objects—markets, schools, hospitals, shelters—have become routine.

Türk’s warning that atrocities seen in El Fasher could be repeated in Kordofan is particularly significant. Advances by RSF and allied SPLM-N forces toward Kadugli, combined with famine conditions and mass displacement, create a high-risk convergence of military pressure and civilian vulnerability.

Women, Peace, and Security: Sexual Violence as a Strategic Weapon

Sexual violence has emerged as a systematic instrument of war, particularly in RSF-controlled areas. Testimonies from women and girls fleeing North Darfur and North Kordofan describe gang rape and sexual enslavement following the fall of El Fasher. These crimes are not incidental; they serve strategic purposes: terrorizing populations, breaking community cohesion, and reshaping demographic control.

Calls by the UN Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict for expanded sanctions under the 1591 regime reflect recognition that impunity remains a central driver of continued abuse. Without accountability mechanisms, sexual violence will continue to function as a low-cost, high-impact tool of domination.

Peace Initiatives: Diplomatic Activity without Convergence

Sudan’s Transitional Prime Minister Kamil El-Tayeb Idris has attempted to reposition the political process by proposing a UN-, AU-, and LAS-monitored ceasefire, RSF withdrawal, and eventual elections. While welcomed by the AU Commission Chairperson as forward-looking, the plan was decisively rejected by the RSF, which currently controls significant territory and has little incentive to demobilize.

The return of national institutions to Khartoum in January is symbolically important but operationally fragile. Control of the capital does not equate to national authority. The Egypt-hosted consultative meeting on Sudan illustrates robust diplomatic engagement, yet coordination among initiatives remains fragmented, and external actors continue to pursue overlapping—but not unified—agendas.

Regional and International Dynamics

The risk of regional destabilization is increasing. Cross-border movement of fighters, weapons, and resources threatens to entangle neighboring states. Egypt’s explicit rejection of recognizing parallel entities and its emphasis on Sudanese unity signals a hardening regional posture, while external arms flows continue to fuel conflict dynamics.

Within the Security Council, divisions persist. Some members emphasize sovereignty and state authority, while others stress accountability and civilian protection. This divergence limits the Council’s capacity to move beyond statements toward enforcement.

Forecast and Strategic Warning

Over the next 30 to 90 days, ASA assesses a high probability of continued military escalation, particularly in Kordofan and Darfur. A comprehensive ceasefire remains unlikely absent a significant shift in incentives or external pressure. Humanitarian conditions are expected to deteriorate further, with famine risks expanding and displacement accelerating.

The conflict’s regionalization risk is rising. Blue Nile State represents a potential ignition point for cross-border instability. Without more frequent and adaptive international engagement, including recalibrated sanctions and accountability mechanisms, Sudan is on track toward entrenched warlordization and de facto partition.

African Security Analysis (ASA) Strategic Warning:
Sudan is approaching a point where conflict dynamics may become irreversible in the medium term, locking the country into a prolonged cycle of violence, fragmentation, and humanitarian catastrophe. Delayed action increases the likelihood that future interventions—military, humanitarian, or diplomatic—will be costlier, less effective, and morally compromised.